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I.

INTRODUCTION

Folk sayings have a certain attractiveness, yet they can also be down-right
confusing. For example, consider the saying "Bad things come in threes," with its
variants announcing that "deaths" or "accidents" come in the same number.
Nevertheless, a Google search for the phrase "saying" and "threes" also generates this
response: "Good things come in threes." For lawyers, occasionally the United States
Supreme Court decides takings cases in "threes," creating a trilogy to consider.' One
*

Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law.

1. For example, consider the 1987 "trilogy" of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987), FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987), and
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis,480 U.S. 470 (1987). See also Carol M. Rose, The Story of
Lucas: Environmental Land Use Regulation Between Developers and the Deep Blue Sea, in Environmental
Law Stories 237, 255-56 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., Foundation Press 2005); Marla E.
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such trilogy was decided in 2005: Lingle v. Chevron US.A., Inc.,2 Kelo v. City of New
4
London,3 and San Remo Hotel, Ltd. Partnershipv. City and County of San Francisco.
Whether or not this particular "threesome" is good or bad depends on perspective. None
of the three, however, actually changed precedent. 5 Takings law will continue to evolve
as it had in the past, which is primarily on an ad hoc basis.
Nevertheless, some in the popular press have responded as if the Supreme Court
had greatly altered private property protections this Term. The Kelo case has generated
the most of this type of publicity. 6 Unlike Lingle and San Remo, in Kelo the government
exercised eminent domain power openly; that is, the case does not determine whether a
"taking" of private property occurred, or whether compensation was due to a private
party. 7 The City of New London, through a development corporation, physically took
title to lands the plaintiffs had owned, and offered them compensation. 8 The issue,
therefore, was whether the acquisition was within the confines of the government's
9
eminent domain power.
The analytical starting point is the Fifth Amendment, which provides in part that
"private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." 10
Although the wording only directly requires compensation as a prerequisite, from early
on, courts have interpreted the Amendment as limiting the exercise of eminent domain to
11
instances of "public use," albeit with differences of opinion about the term's definition.
In Kelo, the public would not have access to all the lands condemned. 12 New London
had assembled land for the public purpose of economic stimulation pursuant to a master

Mansfield, Regulatory Takings, Expectations and Valid Existing Rights, 5 J. Mineral L. & Policy 431, pt. II(C)
(1989-1990); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Status Report, 7 UCLA J. Envtl.
L. & Policy 139 (1988). For an early reference to the 2004-2005 cases as a "trilogy," see John D. Echeverria,
Lingle, Etc.: The US. Supreme Court's 2005 Takings Trilogy, 35 Envtl. L. Rptr. 10577 (2005).
2. 125 S.Ct. 2074 (2005).
3. 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
4. 125 S.Ct. 2491 (2005).
5. In Lingle, the U.S. Supreme Court disavowed some dicta that other courts had transmuted into
a separate takings test, namely that a takings exists when a government action fails to substantially forward
a public interest. 125 S.Ct. at 2087 (disavowing dicta from Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
Nevertheless, because the dicta was not the law of the Agins case, the Lingle decision actually retained existing
Supreme Court precedent. See id.at 2083 (stating Lingle was the "first opportunity" to consider the dicta as a
"freestanding takings test").
6. See William Yardley, After Eminent Domain Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere, 155 N.Y.
Times Al (Nov. 21, 2005) (discussing the lack of development on the site and concluding that the unpopularity
of the decision has hindered zeal to construct improvements). A November 5, 2005 Westlaw search in the
"United States Papers" database for the word "Kelo"--restricted to the date of July 2005 and filtering out
duplicates-brought up 351 documents.
7. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2658.
8. Id. at 2658-60.
9. See id. at 2658.
10. U.S. Const. amend. V.
11. See David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings 192-94 (Foundation Press 2002) (tracing
interpretation as foreclosing purely private takings despite some early commentators avowing that the term is
merely descriptive of the eminent domain power). For a modem rendition of the dual requirements, see
Brown v. Legal Foundationof Washington. 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003) (stating "the taking must be for a
'public use' and 'just compensation' must be paid to the owner" (footnote omitted)).
12. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659. Some of the land in the overall plan would be placed in a park, employed as
roads, or provide waterfront public access. Id. Other land would be developed for offices, residences, and
hotels. Id.
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plan, but private parties would implement the plan, and obtain long-term leases to the
14
property. 1 3 The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the exercise of eminent domain,
noting that it had construed "public use" as encompassing "public advantage." ' 15 States
have split on the issue of whether this is the proper interpretation of particular state
constitutions with similar provisions. 16
Interpreting the federal Constitution, 17 the Supreme Court similarly had not
required that the public retain title to the property, or even generally have access to the
condemned land. For example, it upheld state statutes allowing private parties to
18
The
condemn rights-of-ways across other private lands for the transportation of water.
in
their
for
the
public
what
was
needed
Court opined that state legislatures knew best
More recently, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld two
particular venues. 19
exercises of eminent domain in which private parties would benefit and gain title from
the condemnations. In the first, Berman v. Parker, Congress authorized condemnation
for urban redevelopment in the District of Columbia. 2 1 The condemnation of a private,
non-blighted department store was approved, even though a private business would
succeed to the land. 22 The second case involved the State of Hawaii. In Hawaii
the Court approved a statute designed to counter an
Housing Authority v. Midkiff
oligopoly in land ownership, which had led to residential development pursuant to
ground leases rather than sales of land in fee. 24 Lessees in a subdivision could request
the state housing authority to condemn land; title would go to the private party, not the
As in Berman, the Supreme Court was deferential to the legislative
state. 25
purpose," which it held
determination of "public use," conflating the term with "public
26
"coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."
Given this precedent, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court upheld New
London's activities. 27 The majority, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, underscored the

13. See id at 2659-60, 2660 n. 4.
14. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), aft'd, 125 S. Ct. 2665.
15. See id. at 574.
16. All states except North Carolina have parallel state constitutional provisions against takings. Dana &
Merrill, supra, n. 11, at 2. Perhaps the best-known of the state court decisions is that of Michigan. See
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled, County of
Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004); see also infra, at pt. I(2)(c).
17. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1897) (holding the Fifth
Amendment applicable to the states pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment).
18. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905). See also Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112
(1896).
19. Clark, 198 U.S. at 368. See also U.S. v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) (upholding
Congress's power to determine what is a public use or purpose).
20. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
21. Id. at28.
22. Id. at 31, 33, 36.
23. 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (Justice Marshall took no part in the decision).
24. Id. at 232-33.
25. Id. at 233-34.
26. Id. at 240.
27. Perhaps the more surprising aspect of the case is that four Justices dissented from the opinion-that is,
until the identities of the four are revealed, namely, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia,
and Justice Thomas. Echeverria, supra n. 1, at 10585-86 (arguing that Kelo is most remarkable for being so
closely divided).
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Court's limited holding: it merely held that there was no per se constitutional infirmity
28
with a condemnation for economic development that resulted in a private party's use.
The affirmation of the New London condemnations was therefore fact-dependent. The
particular case was not an example of condemning the land of A to give to B because
there was an overall land-development plan and the identity of the private party that
29
would develop the property was unknown at the time of the condemnation.
Nevertheless, although the majority upheld the particular exercise of eminent domain,
the opinion noted that condemnations for economic development are not necessarily
good public policy, and that legislatures could put limits on the eminent domain power if
politically warranted. 30 The dissenting opinion by Justice O'Connor cautioned that those
who lose their property to condemnation, however, are often those with the least political
power.31
Historically, redevelopment plans most frequently have displaced individuals
either poor, of color, or both. 32 This article proposes a response to the dilemma of
fairness in condemnation in practice. Condemnations could proceed for economic
development, especially when difficult land assemblage might be necessary, but "just
compensation" would require more than fair market value of the property condemned
when the government moves away from "core" condemnation aims, such as for public
buildings, parks, roads, reservoirs, and other direct "uses" of property. This could be
done either judicially or legislatively.
The key to varying the level of compensation for some condemnations is the
central position of reasonable expectations to a definition of property rights. All
property in the United States is held subject to the possibility that government may use

28. Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion, which reflects his distaste for per se categorical decisions
in takings cases. See Marla E. Mansfield, Tahoe-Sierra Returns Penn Central to the Center Track, 38 Tulsa
L. Rev. 263, 284 (2002). Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy also concurred in Kelo to express his belief that
governmental action could be invalidated in an appropriate case even employing a rational relationship test.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
29. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661-62, 2661 n. 6. The hypothetical transfer of land from A to B was discussed in
dicta in Calder v. Bull. 3 U.S. 386, 388-89 (1798). According to the dicta, such a transfer could not be done
constitutionally. Id. The case, however, actually dealt with whether or not a statute directing a court to re-open
a particular case was an ex post facto law. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the prohibition against
ex postfacto laws related to criminal law, not civil laws. Id. at 390-91.
30. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668. This would be through state law limitations on local or state use of eminent
domain. Id.; see David Scharfenberg, Yes, Towns Can Seize Lands, But Aren't There Limits, Westchester
Wkly. Desk 1 (Feb. 5, 2006), in 155 N.Y. Times (Feb. 5, 2006) (three states have passed legislation and
twenty-seven are considering legislation limiting or clarifying condemnations); see also H.R. 4128, 109th
Cong. (Nov. 3, 2005) (limiting states and municipalities from using eminent domain for economic development
if they have received any federal economic development funds in the fiscal year; passed by the House 476
to 38). For examples illustrating a proposed petition initiative in Oklahoma for limitations on the use of
eminent domain, see Okla. Sec. of State, Initiative/Referendum: List of State Question No. 727,
http://www.sos.state.ok.us/documents/Questions/727.pdf (last accessed Nov. 20, 2005); Okla. Sec. of State,
Initiative/Referendum:List of State Question No. 728, http://www.sos.state.ok.us/documents/Questions/728.pdf
(last accessed Nov. 20, 2005); Okla. Sec. of State, Initiative/Referendum: List of State Question No. 729,
http://www.sos.state.ok.us/documents/Questions/729.pdf (last accessed Nov. 20, 2005).
31. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor would construe precedents to
limit condemnations for economic development that result in private use to those undertaken to right an
existing wrong, such as blight or an oligopoly. Id. at 2674. Justice Thomas, however, would declare the
precedents wrong and implement what he discerns as the "original meaning" of the phrase, and require actual
use by the public of the lands condemned. Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 2686-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the eminent domain power, but expectations about the dimension of such eminent
domain power may enter into the compensation calculation. This adjustment of
compensation imports elements of the regulatory taking calculus. The so-called Penn
Central test employs an ad hoc appraisal of factors, namely, the nature of the
governmental purpose, the degree of impact on the regulated, and the interference with
the claimant's reasonable, investment-backed expectations. 33 Determining whether
more than fair market value is required would similarly look to the impacted party's
reasonable-investment bound expectations. The other factors more appropriately help
decide if condemnation is available at all.
The Kelo case offers the potential to blend regulatory takings analysis with
eminent domain theory. The remaining two takings cases from the 2004-2005 Supreme
Court Term directly invoke regulatory takings doctrine. In the first, Lingle, Hawaii
passed a law limiting the amount oil companies could charge as rent to independent
dealers who leased stations from the companies. 34 The Ninth Circuit found the statute to
be a taking because it purportedly would not meet its goal. 35 The Supreme Court,
however, found a taking could not be declared simply because a statute failed to
"'substantially advance legitimate state interests."' 3 6 Dicta from an earlier case
inappropriately insinuated that this formulation was a test for takings, one which was met
independently of any other analysis. 37 The third case, San Remo, involved procedure,
namely, whether there is an exception to the federal full faith and credit statute 38 so as to
allow a claimant to re-litigate whether a violation of the federal Constitution has
transpired after a state court has ruled on the matter. 39 The Supreme Court refused to
except situations where takings precedents may have forced the plaintiff into state
40

court.

Neither Kelo nor the other two takings cases decided this Term alter takings law in
themselves. Greater examination of all three cases forms the bulk of this article. Part II
explores the Kelo decision in detail, including its background, the holdings of the
Supreme Court, and the reasoning of the dissenting and concurring opinions. This Part
also includes a section putting Kelo in the context of some state and federal court
opinions. The Kelo case was clearly not one of judicial activism in which the Supreme
Court discovered a new way to destroy private property rights. It was unquestionably
within both federal and state precedent. Nevertheless, this Part concludes with a section
proposing a modified compensation formula in order to address the sense of unfairness
that arises when private property is condemned for economic development in which
other private parties benefit.
The remainder of the article explores the other two cases, albeit in less detail, and
concludes that takings law has not been steered off course this Term. Part III of the
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See Penn C. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2078.
See id at 2079-80 (citing Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 2077-78 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
Id.
at 2078 (citing Agins, 447 U.S. 255).
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2495.
Id.
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article deals with the Lingle and San Remo decisions. Part IV concludes that the three
cases do not modify the Supreme Court's tendency to judge takings in an ad hoc manner.
Justice Kennedy, author of two concurrences in these three opinions, continues to be
central to the debate as he espouses a distaste of per se rules. 4 1 Because of this, any
42
so-called private property rights revolution has not congealed.
II.

A.

KELO AND THE REQUIREMENT OF "PUBLIC USE" IN CONDEMNATIONS

The Backgroundof Kelo
1.

Facts

As is often the case in the law, how facts are phrased can often presage the legal
conclusion. This is especially true in condemnation cases, where private landowners are
pitted against the plans of governmental agencies. In the Kelo case, only some facts can
be stated without controversy. First, the City of New London had higher unemployment
than the remainder of Connecticut. 43 The 1996 closing of a naval facility exasperated
the problems of the city. 44 Therefore, the announcement that Pfizer Pharmaceuticals
would build a research center in New London was welcome news. 45 Two months later,
a development corporation began investigating ways to capitalize on the move.4 6 What
followed was either the actions of an unelected group 47 attempting to benefit Pfizer and
other private parties, or a carefully vetted 48 scheme for public improvement.
Activity centered in the Fort Trumbull area, which is on a peninsula jutting into the
Thames River. 49 Fort Trumbull included, in addition to private property, the Naval
Undersea Warfare Center, which had occupied thirty-two acres of land. 50 The State of
Connecticut established the Fort Trumbull State Park on eighteen of the acres the Navy
had previously used. 5 1 A redevelopment plan conceived by the New London
Development Corporation ("NLDC"), a private non-profit corporation established to

41. See Mansfield, supra n. 28, at 284 (detailing Justice Kennedy's position against per se rules in
past cases).
42. See Oliver A. Houck, More Unfinished Stories: Lucas, Atlantic Coalition, and Palila/Sweet Home, 75
U. Colo. L. Rev. 331, 343-44 (2004) (recounting the "property rights" movement); Rose, supra n. 1, at 254-57
(encapsulating Justice Rehnquist and the Supreme Court since Penn Central).
43. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658. In 1998, the City had an unemployment rate of almost double the rest of
Connecticut; New London's population had also fallen to its lowest point since 1920. Id. The state office of
policy and management had designated New London a "'distressed municipality."' Kelo, 843 A.2d at 510.
44. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 510.
45. In the Connecticut Court decision, the majority opinion stated Pfizer "now" employed two thousand
people. Id.
46. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (emphasizing the development corporation was a private non-profit corporation and not an
elected body).
48. Id. at 2659-60 (detailing the numerous levels of government that reviewed the development plan
including the city council and state agencies); see also id. at 2661 (citing Kelo, 843 A.2d at 536 (calling the
plan "carefully considered")).
49. Id. at 2659.
50. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
51. Id.
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52
assist the City, included the remainder of the land, as well as 115 private properties.
Adjacent to the Fort Trumbull site, the pharmaceutical company, Pfizer, was investing
$300 million in a research facility. 53 While there were some communications between
Pfizer and the NLDC about Pfizer's desire for hotel space for its business visitors and
residential opportunities for its employees, there was no evidence that Pfizer dictated the
54
terms of the development plan.

Rather than catering to Pfizer, the development plan envisioned capitalizing on
Pfizer's arrival to rejuvenate the area. More specifically, the plan encompassed seven
parcels. 55 A hotel and waterfront conference center, together with restaurant and retail
space, would be built on Parcel 1.56 It would also contain marinas, and be the
originating point of a pedestrian "riverwalk. ''57 Residential development of eighty new
homes would be in Parcel 2, together with public walkways and space for a Coast Guard
museum. 58 Parcel 3 was designed to have at least 90,000 square feet of research and
development office space. 59 Two functions were assigned to Parcel 4. The 2.4 acre
Parcel 4A would support either the adjacent state park or marina, providing parking or
retail outlets. 60 A renovated marina would be on Parcel 4B and it would be the terminus
of the riverwalk. 6 1 The remaining three Parcels, numbered 5 through 7, would be used
for parking, office and retail space, and commercial activities dependent on water. 62 Six
alternate plans were considered. 63 Under the chosen plan, the NLDC would retain title
64
to the properties, leasing them to private developers on ninety-nine year ground leases.
Negotiations enabled the NLDC to acquire most of the tracts. 65 The plaintiffs,
however, would not voluntarily sell. 66 When condemnation actions were filed against
their tracts, they filed suit challenging the condemnation. 67 They owned property in
Parcel 3 and Parcel 4A.68 Three homes would be destroyed to build the office building

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 538-39.
55. For a description of the parcel uses, see Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2659; Kelo, 843 A.2d at 509-10.
56. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
62. Id.
63. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 510.
64. Id. When the properties were condemned, the identity of the private developer was unknown.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661 n. 6. During trial, negotiations were ongoing with Corcoran Jennison to lease
Parcels 1, 2, and 3 for an annual rental of one dollar. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 5 10. Corcoran Jennison would develop
the properties, including marketing and finding tenants. Id.The delay in identifying what private party would
actually benefit from the project led to widely divergent conclusions. Justice Stevens held that it showed the
condemnation was not intended to benefit specific individuals. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2661 n. 6. The dissenting
justices on the Connecticut Supreme Court saw it as evidence that there was no market for office space in New
London, and therefore the intended public benefits would not come to fruition. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 596-98
(Zarella, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
65. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2660.
66. See id
67. Id
68. Id.
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on Parcel 3, but the meeting place of a private cultural organization, the Italian Dramatic
Club, would remain. 6 9 None of the plaintiffs' properties were blighted; the homes of
Susette Kelo and Wilhelmina Dery were "well-maintained, '' 70 and only condenned
71
because of their location in the planned development area.
The development plan, therefore, was not addressing problems with the
condemned land, but more generic problems in New London. Both the Connecticut
Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court began their opinions by describing the plan
as "'projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to
revitalize an economically distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront
areas.' 72 The expected jobs spanned several categories: between 518 and 867
construction jobs, between 718 and 1362 direct jobs, and between 500 and 940 indirect
jobs. 73 The City anticipated property tax revenues would rise between $680,544 and
$1,249,843. 74 At trial, however, all the plaintiffs expressed their attachments to their
properties. Homes were homes of long duration. 75 Rental properties were improved and
7
maintained. 76 The plaintiffs professed a love for the Fort Trumbull area. 77
2.

The Connecticut Supreme Court Decision

The Connecticut Supreme Court faced a split-decision from the trial court. The
trial court found state statutes authorized a taking for economic development, but held
that all the uses delineated were not reasonably necessary to accomplish the
redevelopment plan. 78 Therefore, the trial court upheld the condemnation as it applied to
lands in Parcel 3, the site of the office and research building, together with parking. 79 It
dismissed the condemnation action, however, in regard to Parcel 4A, the tract destined
for support of the adjacent park, finding the purpose too hazy.
The Connecticut
Supreme Court, however, granted New London the right to condemn all of the land.81
After affirming the basic statutory authority for condemnation, it found that the
economic development purposes satisfied the Public Use Clauses of both the federal and
82
state constitutions.

69. Id. at 2671-72 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 2659-60.
72. Id. at 2658 (quoting Kelo, 843 A.2d at 507).
73. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 510.
74. Id
75. Id. at 511.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 511.
79. Id.
80. Id. The case was decided en banc on the Court's own motion. Id. at 507 n. 1. Three justices joined the
opinion of Justice Norcott, making it a four to three decision on the major issue. Two justices joined the
opinion of Justice Zarella, who dissented in part and concurred in part. Id. at 574.
81. Kelo, 843 A.2d 500. In addition to the discussion that follows, the Court considered numerous
questions under Connecticut law; these were not part of the certiorari grant and therefore will not be discussed
in this article.
82. Id. at 528. The Court treated the two as co-extensive, noting the plaintiffs did not allege that the
Connecticut Constitution provided greater protection of private rights. Id. at 521-22.
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court first examined Connecticut precedents that
embraced a broad interpretation of the term "public use." The first, Olmstead v. Camp,
dated 1866, 83 involved a mill act under which condemnation was used to allow private
parties to flood land. 84 The Kelo Court quoted Olmstead extensively:
"One of the most common meanings of the word 'use' as defined by [Webster's
Dictionary], is 'usefulness, utility, advantage, productive of benefit.' 'Public use' may
therefore well mean public usefulness, utility or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit; so that any appropriatingof privateproperty by the state under its right of
eminent
domain for purposes of great advantage to the community, is a takingfor public
5
8

use."

The Court then delineated more recent urban renewal cases in which it accorded a broad
86
construction to the term "public use."
After this review of Connecticut decisions, the Court considered U.S. Supreme
Court precedents, most notably, Berman and Midkiff 87
The Connecticut Court
characterized these two cases as equating pubic use with a public purpose, and with
promoting a deferential standard toward legislative appraisals of such purposes;
therefore, the Olmstead analysis had withstood more than 125 years of
decision-making. 88 The Court thus ruled:
Under this broad and deferential constitutional rubric, we conclude that an economic
development plan that the appropriate legislative authority rationally has determined will
promote significant municipal economic development, constitutes a valid public use for the
exercise of the eminent domain power under both the federal and Connecticut
89
constitutions.
To bolster its conclusion, the Court reviewed some cases from other state courts that also
sanctioned such condemnations.
These decisions from other states supported the Court. The majority delved most
deeply into Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, a Michigan case that
upheld the condemnation of a working class neighborhood in order to allow General
Motors to construct a large manufacturing plant. 9 1 The Court cited Poletown as an
example of how a condemnation could benefit a private party, but still have been for a
"public purpose. ' 92 The Court noted that the decision "informs, but does not dictate, our
decision in the present case." 93 In reviewing this and other cases that endorsed the

83. 33 Conn. 532 (1866).
84. Id.
85. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 522 (quoting Olmstead,33 Conn. at 546) (bracket and emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 523 (discussing Katz v. Brandon, 245 A.2d 579 (Conn. 1968); Gohld Realty Co. v. City of
Hartford,104 A.2d 365 (Conn. 1954)).
87. See infra, at pt. II(C)(I).
88. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 527.
89. Id. at 528.
90. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
91. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 528 n. 39. Poletown was overruled after the Connecticut Court's Kelo decision. See
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004); infra, at pt. II(C)(2).
92. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 528 n. 39.
93. Id. The Court deferred to the condemning authority more than the Michigan Court. The Connecticut
Court rejected the Poletown decision's "heightened scrutiny" test that would be employed when the
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so-called broad definition of public use, 9 4 the Court again found that economic
development plans can be within the Public Use Clause "by creating new jobs,
95
increasing tax and other revenues, and otherwise revitalizing distressed urban areas."
The plaintiffs, however, argued otherwise. First, they tried to distinguish the New
London development proposal from prior Connecticut cases, which had involved urban
renewal in the setting of slum clearing. 96 They alleged that in the prior cases, the
primary purpose of the condemnations was to remove slums and substandard housing;
benefits to private parties were incidental to the primary goal of safety and health. 97 The
Court rejected any distinction:
[B]ecause we already have determined that municipal economic development can be, in
and of itself, a constitutionally valid public use[,] .. we also conclude that private benefit
from such economic development is, just as in the blight and substandard housing
clearance cases, secondary to the public benefit that results
from significant economic
98
growth and revitalized financial stability in a community.
The plaintiffs also argued that some state courts had rejected the use of eminent domain
for economic development. 9 9
The Connecticut Court acknowledged this, but
concentrated on Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City
Environmental,L.L.C.,1 o rebutting the plaintiffs' characterization of the case. 101 To the
Connecticut Court, Illinois did not adopt a "bright-line" ' 10 2 test against condemnations
that could benefit private entities.10 3 Instead, it found that the case entailed a
fact-specific denial of the particular use of eminent domain. 10 4 The condemnation
lacked an over-riding public purpose and planning process, including a failure to look at
alternatives to the land acquisition that the private race-track requested. 10 5 Therefore,
the Southwestern Illinois Development Authority case did not support a facial challenge
against the use of eminent domain for economic development as contained in the
Connecticut statute. 106 The Court then turned to an "as applied" analysis of the
particular New London proposal.

condemnation power benefits "identifiable private interests." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Kelo
Court found this test would clash with Connecticut's "well established approach of deference to legislative
determinations of public use." Id. Therefore, the overruling of Poletown did not remove a crucial
underpinning for the Connecticut decision.
94. See id.at 531 n. 41 (citing Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain vol. 2A, §§ 7.02[2]-[7]
(3d ed., Lexis Publg. 2000) (discussing the treatise's distinction between a "narrow" definition of public use,
which requires that property taken be used by the public or be available for public use, and the "broad"
definition of public use, which equates the same with "public advantage")).
95. Kelo, 843 A.2dat 531.
96. Id. (citing Katz, 245 A.2d 579; Gohld Realty Co., 104 A.2d 365).
97. Id.
98. Id.at 532.
99. Id.
100. 768 N.E.2d 1 (111. 2002) (rejecting condemnation designed to enlarge a racing track's parking lot).
101. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 532-36.
102. Id. at 534 (citing S. W. Ill. Dev. Auth., 768 N.E.2d at 240).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 535.
105. Id.at 534-35.
106. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 536.
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The first problem was identifying the primary beneficiary of the plan-the public
or private entities. 10 7 The landowners claimed it was Pfizer and the developer, Corcoran
Jennison.10 8 The Court, however, reviewed and affirmed the factual findings of the trial
court, namely, that Pfizer did not direct the development plans, but was the catalyst for
New London to try to capitalize on the unusual fact that Pfizer was relocating to a brown
field in an urban setting. 10 9 The potential benefit of jobs in an area suffering from
unemployment was substantial. 1 10 The Court underscored that it was not affirming the
public benefit finding simply because the City would receive more taxes:
[O]ur decision is not a license for the unchecked use of the eminent domain power as a tax
revenue raising measure; rather, our holding is that rationally considered municipal
economic development projects such as the development plan in the present case pass
constitutional muster. I11
The Court also held that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding that
contractual requirements and statutory restraints mandating the land to be used in
conformity with the development plan, provided sufficient assurance of future public
use; there is no requirement that clear and convincing evidence show the justifying
public benefits to be achievable. 112 After approving the general plan, the Court
examined the standard of review for including certain tracts in the condemnation area.
When it came to specific tracts, the trial court had upheld the condemnations in
regard to Parcel 3, but not Parcel 4A. 1 13 On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that it was not
reasonably necessary to condemn their homes in Parcel 3 as part of the site for the office
park because the project could be developed leaving their houses in place. 114 The
Connecticut Supreme Court, however, placed the burden on the party opposing
condemnation to show that the inclusion of a tract was unreasonable, in bad faith, or an
abuse of power. 115 In reviewing the trial court, the Court upheld its findings because
they were not in clear error. 116 However the Court reversed the trial court's finding that
the taking of properties in Parcel 4A was not reasonably necessary because there was no
definite plan in place for use of the Parcel. 1 17 The Connecticut Supreme Court avowed
that once a court concludes that an enabling statute supports a public purpose, great
deference should be given to the legislative determination of how to achieve that public

107. Id. 536-37.
108. Id.

109. Id. at 536-42.
110. Id. at 542.
111. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 543.
112. Id. at 544, 544 n. 62. The dissent, in imposing such a review standard, was requiring a standard of
proof as to future events that the majority considered to be without precedent. Id. at 544 n. 62.
113. Id.
at 545.
114. Id.at 552.

115. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 556.
116. Id. at 557. The Court also found the takings on Parcel 3 were necessary for reasonably foreseeable
needs; despite a lack of immediate development of the subject tracts, condemnation must take into account
orderly progression in development, which acknowledges that not all project components are immediately
begun. Id. at 558-62. The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection argument, which arose because
the development plans allowed the privately owned Italian Drama Club to remain on the site. Id. at 562-68.
There was a rational distinction between the social club and private residences. Id.
117. Kelo, 843 A.2dat 574.
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purpose. 118 The trial court had conducted a necessary review beyond the determination
of whether the inclusion was unreasonable, in bad faith, or an abuse of power. 119 The
Court, therefore, approved the use of condemnation for the entire Fort Trumbull
economic development project.
Three judges of the Connecticut Court dissented in Kelo. Interestingly, the dissent
agreed that the statute authorizing condemnations for economic development passed
facial constitutional muster. 120 Additionally, the dissent agreed that "the takings were
intended primarily to benefit the public."' 12 1 The reason for the difference in result,
however, was the dissent required the taking agency to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the result would be achieved. 122 This burden was not met:
The record contains scant evidence to suggest that the predicted public benefit will be
realized with any reasonable certainty. To the contrary, the evidence establishes that, at the
time of the takings, there was no signed agreement to develop the properties, the economic
climate was poor and the development plan contained no conditions pertaining to future
development agreements that
would ensure achievement of the intended public benefit if
123
development were to occur.
Although the dissent would not require proof to a certainty that private economic
development would take place as envisioned, the difficulties were, in its estimation, too
124
apparent at the planning stage.
In sum, all of the Connecticut justices concluded that economic development could
be a valid public use to support eminent domain under a broad reading of the term
"public use" to include "public advantage." 125 This did not mean that any and all
condemnations so-labeled would be constitutional; the majority of the Court found that
"rationally considered municipal economic development projects such as the
development plan in the present case pass constitutional muster. ' 126 Moreover, the
particular development plan was not primarily designed to benefit private individuals,
but was designed to create jobs and improve the economy of an area that had been
designated in need. Once making such a finding, the Court would not second-guess the
legislative decision to include particular lands within a project absent particular

118. Seeid. at569.
119. Id. at 572-73.
120. Id.at 593 (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121. Id.at 595 (emphasis in original). They disagreed on whether the trial court's findings on public purpose
should be considered factual and subject to deferential review, but came to the same conclusion on whether the
purpose was public. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 595.
122. Id. at 596. When a private party receives benefit from the condemnation, both the majority and dissent
noted a possibility of abuse. The dissent, therefore, proposed heightened scrutiny with an elaborate shifting
burden of proof for the various requirements of a takings case: (1) the party opposing a taking must prove the
statutory scheme involved is unconstitutional in light of judicial deference to legislative findings of public
use; (2) if the statutory purpose (such as economic development) is constitutional, the opposing party must
prove "the primary intent of the particular economic development plan is to benefit private, rather than public,
interests," id. at 588; and (3) in the event neither of these burdens are met, the party seeking the condemnation
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the plan will "in fact," id.,
provide public benefit. Id.
at 587-88.
123. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 596.
124. Id.at 602.
125. Id at 531, 531 n. 41.
126. Id.at 543.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol41/iss2/6

12

Mansfield: Takings and Threes: The Supreme Court's 2004-2005 Term

TAKINGS AND THREES

2005]

circumstances. The dissent disagreed on one factual question, namely, whether the
takings were likely to benefit the public. The three dissenting justices also disagreed on
the assignment of the burden of proof on various issues. Nevertheless, they did not adopt
a per se rule placing all takings for economic development beyond the confines of the
Public Use Clause.
B.

The Supreme Court Decision
1.

The Majority Decision by Justice Stevens

Justice Stevens phrased the issue on certiorari forthrightly: "[W]hether a city's
decision to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies the 'public
use' requirement of the Fifth Amendment." 12 7 The answer was affirmative. In reaching
this conclusion, Justice Stevens quickly turned to the facts of the particular case,
characterizing the case as neither of two easy scenarios: It was not a transfer of land from
A to B for purely private use, nor one in which the transfer resulted in "use by the
public"' 12 8 despite the transfer of title to a private party, as would result when a
condemnation benefited a common carrier railroad. 129 Therefore, to Justice Stevens, the
intent of the condemning agency and procedures through which the condemnation took
place were both important.
Applying the facts to the first possibility, that is, whether New London's action
was a purely private taking, Justice Stevens emphasized that the taking was not done
under a pretext of a public purpose, but pursuant to a "'carefully considered'
development plan."' 130 It was not done "'to benefit a particular class of identifiable
individuals,"'' 13 1 especially when the identity of the developer was unknown at the time
condemnation began. 132 Justice Stevens acknowledged that not all the land would be
open to the public; however, he also noted that the use by the public test had long been
discarded.1 33 Therefore, he turned to the question of "whether the City's development
plan serves a 'public purpose, ' 134 noting that Supreme Court cases "have defined that
concept broadly, reflecting [its] longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments
in this field." 135 The opinion proceeded to review three precedents; all three of which
upheld government action.
The first precedent discussed was Berman, in which Congress authorized
condemnation of portions of the District of Columbia to allow for redevelopment,
127. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661. Justice Stevens began the Kelo decision by phrasing the issue as "whether the
city's proposed disposition of this property qualifies as a 'public use' within the meaning of the Takings Clause

of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution." Id. at 2658 (footnote omitted). Justices Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined Justice Stevens's opinion. Id.
128. Id. at 2661 (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id.
130. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661 (quoting Kelo, 843 A.2d at 536).
131. Id. at 2662 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245).

132. Id. at 2661 n. 6 ("It is, of course, difficult to accuse the government of having taken A's property to
benefit the private interests of B when the identity of B was unknown.").
133. Id. at 2662.
134. Id. at 2663.
135. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663.
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including low-income housing. 136 Justice Stevens observed that some of the land would
be leased or sold to private parties, and the objecting landowner had a non-blighted
department store condemned. 137 Justice Stevens emphasized the portion of the Berman
opinion where the Court opined that review of condemnation actions should not be on
the basis of a tract-by-tract review, and the public purpose sought to be forwarded can
include aesthetics as well as safety. 138 The second case was Midkiff in which the Court
upheld a Hawaii statute that transferred title to residential lessees in order to alleviate a
concentration of ownership of fee lands. 139 Noting that the prior court found this to be a
public purpose, Justice Stevens emphasized that Midkiff approved the transfer to private
parties as simply being the "mechanics '1 40 of achieving a public purpose. 14 1 The third
142
in which the manufacturer of a pesticide
case was Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
objected to provisions of an environmental law. 143 The law allowed the Environmental
Protection Agency to use data, a prior applicant submitted, in judging another company's
subsequent application, so long as compensation was paid. 144 Justice Stevens's
summary of this case centered on its acknowledgment that subsequent applicants were
the "most direct beneficiaries" 145 of the statute, but that the statute's aim of enhancing
competition was a valid public purpose. 146
Justice Stevens concluded that prior case law provided for an ad hoc review
responsive to particular and changing situations:
Viewed as a whole, our jurisprudence has recognized that the needs of society have
varied between different parts of the Nation, just as they have evolved over time in
response to changed circumstances. Our earliest cases in particular embodied a strong
theme of federalism, emphasizing the "great respect" that we owe to state legislatures and
state courts in discerning local public needs. For more than a century, our public use
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of
affording legislatures
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the
147
takings power.

Because of precedent, and the limited nature of review, Justice Stevens found the local
government was entitled to find the area around Fort Trumbull, while not blighted, was
in need of "economic rejuvenation. ' , 148 As in Berman, the Court would not look at the
project tract by tract, but in light of the comprehensive plan put forward.

136. Id.(discussing Berman, 348 U.S. at 28).
137. Id. (discussing Berman, 348 U.S. at 31).
138. Id. (discussing Berman, 348 U.S. at 33). The Berman Court noted: "It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean,
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
139. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2663 (discussing Midkiff 467 U.S. at 231-32).
140. Id.2664 (quoting Midkiff 467 U.S. at 244) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id.(discussing Midkiff,467 U.S. at 244).
142. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
143. Kelo, 125 U.S. at 2664 (discussing Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 986). The act implicated in Monsanto was
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (1976).
144. Kelo, 125 U.S. at 2664 (discussing Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 992).
145. Id. (quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Id.(discussing Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1014-15).
147. Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
148. Id.at 2664-65.
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The petitioners, however, urged the Court to provide a "bright-line rule that
economic development does not qualify as a public use."'149 Justice Stevens rejected this
suggestion on both precedential and logical grounds. 150 To him, government has long
been in the business of promoting economic growth; he averred: "It would be
incongruous to hold that the City's interest in the economic benefits to be derived from
the development of the Fort Trumbull area has less of a public character than any of
those other interests [upheld in past cases]." ' 15 1 As a subset of this argument, the
petitioners argued that economic development condemnations would "[blur] the
boundary between public and private takings."' 15 2 However, Justice Stevens delineated
prior cases in which private parties also benefited from the public purposes being
forwarded, citing Midkiff and Monsanto.1 5 3

In a footnote, Justice Stevens criticized

Justice O'Connor with "confus[ing] the purpose of a taking with its mechanics"15 4 when
she questions whether private parties could forward a public purpose.
ownership may be the means to achieve a public end.

15 5

Private

Additionally, Justice Stevens

characterized the Court's prior cases as focusing on the future use of the property to
define the public purpose; the condemnations were not upheld because the government

15 6
was removing existent harmful land uses.
Other arguments against upholding the condemnation were also rejected. Justice
Stevens concurred that a direct transfer from A to B for the sole reason that B would put
the land to more productive use would be suspect, but concluded that courts could deal
with such "aberrations" 157 when they happened without excluding economic
development from public use generically. 158 Additionally, there was no need to extract a
special degree of "reasonable certainty" 159 that the public purposes would likely be met
when private parties received the land; not only would that modify precedent, but would
postpone judicial approval of a project until later in the redevelopment scenario than is
advisable in order to proceed with orderly development. 160 Moreover, a court should not
16 1
second-guess what lands are necessary to complete a project.

149. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
150. He also rejects the conclusion that the project would only have economic benefits. Id. Although this
point is not elaborated, he most likely is referring to recreational, aesthetic, and safety enhancements that the
redevelopment might entail. In fact, Justice O'Connor notes that the plan "promises an array of incidental
benefits (even aesthetic ones)," id. at 2676, as she disparages the prominence the majority gave to the existence
of a plan in upholding the taking. Id.
151. Id.at 2665. In a footnote, Justice Stevens rejected a reading of Berman that would have read it as
narrowly defining the public purpose as blight removal; if that were the case, Justice Stevens argued, then
taking the non-blighted department store would not have been justified. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2665 n. 13.
152. Id.at2666.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2666 n. 16 (emphasis in original).
155. Id.
156. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666 n. 16.
157. Id.
at2667n. 17.
158. Id. at2667.
159. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. Id.
at 2667-68.
161. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2668.
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In conclusion, Justice Stevens recognized that compensation alone would not
alleviate all hardships the owners of condemned property might encounter. 162 Nothing
163
would preclude states from rejecting economic development through condemnation.
The Court's review was necessarily limited:
This Court's authority, however, extends only to determining whether the City's proposed
condemnations are for a "public use" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. Because over a century of our case law interpreting that provision
dictates an 64
affirmative answer to that question, we may not grant petitioners the relief that
they seek. 1
165
The wisdom of such a use of condemnation could be debated in the political realm.
2.

The Concurring Opinion by Justice Kennedy

Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion, but he also wrote a concurrence.
Justice Kennedy emphasized that the decision of the Court was fact-dependent.

166
167

Therefore, he urged that, even if a rational basis review of condemnation decisions is all
the Fifth Amendment requires, there were condemnation actions that would not survive
such a review, 168 He identified those undertaken with a primary desire to benefit
individuals, with only an incidental public benefit, as deficient. 169 Nevertheless, the
record in Kelo was replete with evidence of the public purpose and the condemnation
was constitutional. 17 Justice Kennedy, however, stressed that a rejection of a per se
17 1
invalidity rule does not reduce the Court to a rubber stamp.
To Justice Kennedy, review under Berman and Midkiff has meaning. Additionally,
in certain instances, more stringent review may be invoked:
My agreement with the Court that a presumption of invalidity is not warranted for
economic development takings in general, or for the particular takings at issue in this case,
does not foreclose the possibility that a more stringent standard of review than that
announced in Berman and Midkiff might be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn
category of takings. There may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected
impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or
172
otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Seeid.
Id.
Id.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 2670.
Id.
Id. Justice Kennedy, id, commented:

A court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause should strike down a taking
that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or
pretextual public benefits, just as a court applying rational-basis review under the Equal Protection
Clause must strike down a government classification that is clearly intended to injure a particular
class of private parties, with only incidental or pretextual public justifications.
170. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at2670.
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 547-50 (1998) [hereinafter Eastern Enterprises]
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Although Justice Kennedy did not delineate the condemnations that would be
unconstitutional, he maintained that they exist and can be rooted out without per se
rules. 173 New London, however, had undergone an elaborate planning procedure that
resulted in a comprehensive development plan with a more than de minimis public
economic benefit. 174 Moreover, the record revealed that individual developers were not
named until late in the process. 175 Therefore, the case did not require a heightened
review. 176
3.

The Dissenting Opinions by Justices O'Connor and Thomas

Two dissenting opinions were filed in the five to four decision in Kelo. Justice
O'Connor authored a dissent in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined. 177 Justice Thomas also authored a dissent. 178 Both dissents would
outlaw using condemnation for "economic development."' 179 The rationales of the
opinions, however, differed.

Justice O'Connor sought to distinguish Supreme Court

precedents; Justice Thomas would overrule them and return the Court to what he
characterized as the original meaning of the Public Use Clause.

Justice O'Connor, as is her habit, refers to the Takings Clause protections as being
rooted in "fairness and justice." 180 When condemnations are at issue, she delineates two
requirements: "public use" and "compensation,"
property. 1 8 1

both necessary to give security to

Compensation prevents imposing costs on one property owner that all

should share. 1 8 2

The Public Use requirement, to her, circumscribes governmental

power: "Government may compel an individual to forfeit her property for the public's
use, but not for the benefit of another private person."' 18 3 The final arbiter of the line
1 84
between the two, despite deference to the legislature, must be the judicial branch.

Justice O'Connor therefore turns to legal precedent.

(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (requiring heightened scrutiny for retroactive legislation
under the Due Process Clause)).
173. Id.at 2670. Justice Kennedy's conclusion contains the potential criteria for invalidity: "In sum, while
there may be categories of cases in which the transfers are so suspicious, or the procedures employed so prone
to abuse, or the purported benefits are so trivial or implausible, that courts should presume an impermissible
private purpose, no such circumstances are present in this case." Id.at 2670-71.
174. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2670.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.at2671.
178. Id. at 2677.
179. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671, 2678.
180. Id. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil, Inc. v. Tahoe Regl.
Plan.Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a general appraisal of Justice
O'Connor's allegiance to these dual concepts, see Mansfield, supra n. 28, at 283. She returned to the concept
of fairness in assessing burdens as being central to takings analysis in the opinion she wrote for a unanimous
Court in Lingle. See Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2084-85.
181. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2672 (O'Connor,J.,
dissenting).
182. Id.
183. Id. (emphasis in original).
184. Id.at2673.
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She asserts that three types of cases delineate the meaning of "public use." The
first, and easiest to confirm, are those approving transfer to public ownership. 185 The
186
second type consists of cases in which the recipient of the land is a public carrier.
Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor deems these two scenarios-namely, "public ownership"
and "use-by-the public"-as "sometimes too constricting and impractical"' 187 to be the
sole definition of Public Use. 188 The third type of case in which condemnation is
appropriate includes Berman and Midkiff To Justice O'Connor, this category consists of
189
cases in which the condemnations at issue negated existing harms.
In Kelo, Justice O'Connor hews close to the actual holdings of Berman and
Midkiff rather than employing the oft-quoted equations of public use with public purpose
that are contained within the cases. 19 Although she acknowledges that the cases prized
deference to legislatures, she read them as adhering to the bedrock principle that a purely
private taking could not be justified, even with compensation:
In both those cases, the extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property
inflicted affirmative harm on society-in Berman through blight resulting from extreme
poverty and in Midkiff through oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth. And in both
cases, the relevant legislative body had found that eliminating the existing property use was
necessary to remedy the harm. Thus a public purpose was realized when the harmful use
was eliminated. Because each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter
19 1
that the property was turned over to private use.
To Justice O'Connor, it was the direct public benefit from changing the existent use that
made these condemnations fit the definition of "public use." There was no need to
equate public use with the "police power,"' 192 as language in Midkiff and Berman
19 3
seemingly did.
It is precisely a situation such as the facts in Kelo that Justice O'Connor argued
illustrated the error of conflating the two concepts. There was no harmful use before the
condemnation. Therefore, she characterized the Kelo majority as
hold[ing] that the sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private use,
and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to
generate some secondary benefit for the public-such as increased tax revenue, more jobs,
194
maybe even aesthetic pleasure.
She sees no limitation in the majority opinion, accusing both it and the concurrence of
not detailing how anyone could truly detect an "illicit purpose" 195 behind a taking: "The
trouble with economic development takings is that [the] private benefit and incidental

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
See id.
at 2674.
See infra, at pt. II(C)(1) (discussing federal precedents).
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
Id at 2675.
Id. (citing Midkiff 467 U.S. at 240; Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
Id
Id.
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public benefit are, by definition, merged and mutually reinforcing." 196 Moreover, she
argued, the motive of the government should not be determinative of the propriety of the
regardless of whether the
condemnation; the private property owner is bereft of property
197
primary purpose was to benefit an individual or the public.
The remainder of the majority opinion gave no additional comfort to Justice
O'Connor. She identified a presumption in the opinion, namely that condemnation will
only be used to "upgrade" property. 198 Because the Due Process Clause prohibits
99
irrational action, she found this requirement added no protection to private property. 1
The Court's disengagement from predicting the efficacy of a proposed governmental
action underscored the lack of restraint. 200 Additionally, no single existing use of
property can generally be deemed the best possible, which would mean that "[t]he
specter of condemnation hangs over all property. ' 2 0 1 She also faulted the majority's
reliance on the particular facts of the case, namely, that the taking arose after a
"relatively careful deliberative process' '2 2 and was for an integrated, not
parcel-by-parcel, plan. 2 03 She found no logical limit; the Court legitimized a taking
based on legislative predictions of secondary public benefits from an economic
development after a transfer of property rights. 2° 4 To her, Justice Stevens's final
comment that states could limit the use of eminent domain was an abdication of the
Court's responsibility to protect constitutional rights, and one which would disparately
Therefore, she would reject these
benefit those with political influence. 2° 5
2 6
condemnations. 0
Justice Thomas similarly would overrule the Connecticut Supreme Court. He
would not, however, limit the holdings of Berman and Midkiff, he would, instead,
reconsider the cases and return to what he terms the "original meaning" 2° 7 of the Public
Use Clause. 208 To Justice Thomas, the Clause is a "meaningful limit on the
government's eminent domain power" ;209 one which allowing economic development
takings to be public use has eviscerated. 21 Compensation is not the only Fifth
Amendment requirement; public use must be an independent prerequisite, or else the
Constitution would demand compensation when land is taken for public use, but not

196. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 2676.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
dissenting).
201. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O'Connor, J.,
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2677.
206. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 2677-78. He complains that the term "Public Use Clause," id.at 2677, has been erased in favor
of a "Public Purpose Clause," id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted), or "perhaps the 'Diverse and
Always Evolving Needs of Society' Clause," Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J.,dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
209. Id. at 2678.
210. Id.
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when it is taken for private use.2 11 Several interpretive aids required Justice Thomas to
reject extending the Clause to include condemnations for public purposes.
First, Justice Thomas examined the wording of the Constitution itself to justify
limiting condemnation to when the public has access to the lands. Justice Thomas
averred that the "natural reading" 2 12 of public use "allows the government to take
property only if the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the
property. ' 2 13 He cited a dictionary published in 1773 as defining "use '214 as "[t]he act
of employing any thing to any purpose." 215 To Justice Thomas, if the public has no right
to use the property, it could not be "employing" it. 216 He rejected a broader meaning of
"use," in the sense of making something more convenient, because of the context of the
Public Use Clause. 2 17 Other parts of the Constitution refer to "use," and he finds these
references incorporate the narrower meaning. 2 18 Moreover, he contrasted the phrase
"public use" with "general welfare," appearing elsewhere in the Constitution, as well as,
"public exigencies" and "public necessity," terms appearing in the Northwest Ordinance
2 19
and some state constitutions; the language differentiation implied different meanings.
Therefore, he found the wording of the Constitution compelled a narrow meaning.
Beyond the wording of the Constitution, Justice Thomas marshaled evidence for
his position in the common law background of the Constitution. By examining Kent and
Blackstone, he posited that there was a distinction between nuisance and eminent
domain. 22 Through nuisance law, governments could remedy hindrances to the public
welfare without expending money. 22 1 Eminent domain, however, was exercised when
222
the government, like a private party, wanted to acquire land for its own use.
Moreover, the Public Use Clause was a limitation on power, not a grant of power such as
is found in the "Necessary and Proper" Clause of the Constitution, which gave Congress
the authority to do anything "necessary and proper" in relation to its enumerated
powers. 2 23 A public purpose reading of the Public Use Clause would duplicate the
inquiry of a "necessary and proper" analysis. 224 Therefore, Justice Thomas concluded
that "[t]he Clause is thus most naturally read to concern whether the property is used by

211. See id.
212. Id. at 2679.
213. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
214. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing the term "use" in other sections of the
Constitution embraces the narrow meaning; discussing section 10 of Article 1, referring to funds being for the
"Use of the Treasury" as meaning the treasury will control the taxes, and section 8 of Article 1, referring to
"use" of moneys for raising an army as being limited to that purpose).
219. Id. at 2680.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2680-81.
224. Id. at 2680.
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the public or the government, not whether the purpose of the taking is legitimately
22 5
public."
In light of this reading of the Clause, Justice Thomas critiques precedent. He
found that early state cases supported his reading, limiting takings to condemnations that
provided "public goods"; even when allowing private parties to gain title, the businesses
forwarded were in the nature of common carriers. 226 Some cases might have stretched
the boundaries, but he would not allow such cases to change the natural meaning.2 27 On
the Supreme Court stage, he faulted two lines of cases with expanding the Public Use
Clause. One line concentrated on the public purpose of the taking; 228 the other involved
deference to legislative choices. 229 Neither line of cases were justified or explained. To
Justice Thomas, the whittling away of protection for traditional property from
230
condemnation is magnified by the recent concern for non-traditional property rights.
The cases commanding Justice Thomas's greatest displeasure are Berman and
Midkiff He accused the Court in Berman of "question begging ' ' 23 1 and not deciding the
nature of the constitutional limitation on condemnation. 232 To him, the Public Use
of
Clause limited Congress's use of its enumerated powers. 233 The fundamental error 234
both cases was "equating the eminent domain power with the police power of States."
To Justice Thomas, there is no way to apply the "public purpose" test in a principled
manner. 2 35 Therefore, he would return to the natural meaning of the Clause, and require
actual use by the government, or that the public gain a right to use the property through
236
the condemnation.
Both Justice O'Connor, writing for a four Justice dissent, and Justice Thomas,
writing for himself, would reject condemnations that are for economic development.
There would be no room for individual factual appraisals. Justice Thomas, in his
conclusion, noted that the impact of prior redevelopment schemes had fallen
disproportionately on the poor and citizens of color. 237 Therefore, leaving protections to
the political realm would not be appropriate.
C.

The Kelo Case in Perspective: Per Se Rules and Precedents

Taking Kelo at face value, the effect of the majority was simply to reject a per se
rule that invalidates takings for economic development under the Fifth Amendment of

225. Id. at 2681.
226. Id. at 2681-82.
227. Id. at 2682.
228. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2683 (citing FallbrookIrrigationDist., 164 U.S. 112).
229. Id.at 2684 (citing GettysburgElec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668).
230. Id. at 2684-85. In regard to deference to the legislature, Justice Thomas compares the lack of such
deference in reviewing reasonable search procedures with that of review of condemnation: "Though citizens
at 2685.
are safe from the government in their homes, the homes themselves are not." Id.
231. Id.
232. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
at 2686.
236. Id.
237. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2686-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the United States. Under Kelo, benefit to a private party does not automatically render a
taking of private property outside of the public use requirement, but the case does
acknowledge that some condemnation schemes might cross the boundary into prohibited
private takings. Both federal and state precedents are in line with this position.
Naturally, state courts have varying views, 238 but one of the most famous discussions of
the public use issue emerged in Michigan. In Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court
upheld a taking in which a non-blighted working class neighborhood was uprooted in
order to assemble land for a General Motors plant. Many commentators attacked the
decision, not simply on legal grounds, 239 but also because of the negative impact on
members of minorities and the p6or. 24° The Michigan Court overruled Poletown, but the
framework it laid down in its County of Wayne v. Hathcock24 1 decision did not simply
outlaw condemnations for economic development in which private parties benefit.
242
Hathcock set out exceptions to the presumption of invalidity for such condemnations.
Therefore, the Kelo case and the Hathcock case are mirror-images, both ending up
without a per se conclusion.
1.

Federal Fifth Amendment Precedents

As the Kelo case itself noted the federal response to when condemnation is
appropriate often began with a stark dichotomy: a clear violation of the "social
compact" 243 if property is taken from A to give to B regardless of compensation, 244 and
a clearly appropriate use of condemnation if property is taken from A and put to a use in
which the public has access to the condemned land.245 An archetypical example of the
246
latter is condemning land to build a post office, a highway, or a military cemetery.
The line, however, quickly blurred.2 47

238. See generally Adam Mossoff, The Death of Poletown: The Future of Eminent Domain and Urban
Development After County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 837, 841, 841 n. 18 (collecting
state cases).
239. For example, Justice O'Connor referred to the Poletown decision as "infamous." Kelo, 125 S. Ct.
at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See generally Kelo, 843 A.2d at 535-36, 536 n. 48-49 (listing a collection
of citations to law review articles supporting and disputing the use of eminent domain for economic
development).
240. Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings,
and the Future of Public Use, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1005, 1035-38 (describing the general impact of urban
renewal on the poor and minorities, and noting those remaining in Poletown were the white elderly).
241. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
242. Id. at 781.
243. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661 n. 5 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. at 388) (internal quotation marks omitted).
244. This situation was discussed in dicta in Calder. It was labeled as being unconstitutional. Calder,3 U.S.
at 388-89. The case actually dealt with whether or not a statute directing a court to re-open a particular case
was an ex postfacto law. Id. at 386-87. The Supreme Court concluded that the prohibition against ex post
facto laws related to criminal law, not civil laws. Id. at 390-95; see also Mo. P. Ry. Co. v. Neb., 164 U.S. 403,
417 (1896) (characterizing the requirement that a railroad allow private parties to build an elevator for private
use on the railway's right-of-way as an unconstitutional taking of private property for private use).
245. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
246. Although there was actual public use involved in this situation, the case confirming condemnation for a
Gettysburg memorial is most known and cited for the proposition that Congress has wide authority to declare
whether or not something is in the "public purpose." See Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668. The Court
noted that instilling patriotism could be such a purpose. See id. at 682.
247. See generally James W. Ely, Jr., Thomas Cooley, "Public Use," and New Directions in Takings
Jurisprudence,2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 845, 845-53.
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At first, the Supreme Court approved statutes that employed condemnation to
benefit common carriers. Because a common carrier must provide service to the public,
private ownership of the railroad or tunnel was deemed irrelevant. 24 8 The Supreme
Court, however, also did not invalidate statutes giving private parties the right to
condemn for a millsite or for an irrigation ditch, even though neither of the benefited
private owners were under a regulatory duty to serve. 249 In most of these cases, the
Supreme Court upheld state court determinations, thus revealing that at least some state
courts were taking similarly broadened views of condemnation power. One rationale for
affirming these statutes was the position that local legislatures knew best what was
needed in different locales. 25° Mining might be central to one state's economy, 2 51 and
movement of
water scarcity drive the public need in another.2 52 Incremental
2 53
constitutional condemnation beyond actual "public use" continued.
In 1954, however, the Supreme Court unanimously decided Berman.254 Congress,
acting under its power to govern the District of Columbia, authorized a Planning and
255
Redevelopment Commission to look at the substandard housing and slum conditions.
The District Court noted the question as follows:
We can quickly dispose of the case in so far as it relates to certain parts of the property
in the project area. The power to acquire by eminent domain property to be devoted to
streets (including the "expressway"), schools, recreation centers, parks (including the
"greenway"), and other "public uses" is established beyond question. Likewise the power
to acquire by eminent domain real estate to be used for the construction of low-cost
housing is established in this jurisdiction .... Our problem concerns the remainder of the
property in the area, which is to be acquired by eminent domain and sold or leased to
private persons for private uses, with the provision that not less than one-third2 56of the
housing accommodations to be built on the property are to be for low-rent housing.
More particularly, the problem in Berman involved condemnation of land that was not in
itself blighted; commercial property was included in lands determined ripe for

248. See Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. at 679-83.
249. See Clark, 198 U.S. 361; Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. 112; see also Hairston v. Danville &
W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908) (approving condemnation for a rail spur that would not be useful to the
general public).
250. See Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1923) (holding necessity of use for public
water system is a state legislative decision). Congress was also given the benefit of the doubt. See Old
Dominion Land Co. v. U.S., 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925) (declaring a decision of Congress on condemnation of
lands for military purpose "entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility").
251. See Strickley v. HighlandBoy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906).
252. See Clark, 198 U.S. at 367-68.
253. This included condemning land to provide for a new townsite after the old townsite was flooded for a
public water project. See Brown v. U.S., 263 U.S. 78 (1923). In a similar vein, the Tennessee Valley Authority
was authorized to condemn private property for incorporation into a National Park as an adjunct to acquisitions
for a reservoir when the land would be isolated by the reservoir. See U.S. ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v.
Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946). In this case, the Supreme Court noted that it had never overturned a
condemnation that the highest court of the relevant state had upheld. Id. at 552 (quoting Hairston,208 U.S.
at 607). State courts, however, could invalidate takings under state constitutional law and insulate the decision
from review, therefore limiting the cases that came before the Supreme Court.
254. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
255. The Districtof Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-592, 60 Stat. 790 (1946).
256. Schneider v. D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency, 117 F. Supp. 705, 711 (D.D.C. 1953).
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"urban redevelopment." 2 57
The lower court temporized, but was protective of private property. Nevertheless,
it refused to find the statute totally unconstitutional.
As long as the District
Redevelopment Act was directed at buildings that either created or perpetuated
"conditions injurious to the public health, safety, morals and welfare,, 258 it was valid. In
fact, pursuant to eminent domain, title to the property could be taken and directed to
another private party, but only if necessary to such end, namely eliminating a slum or
preventing a slum from arising. 259 The mere presence of a slum would not be
justification in and of itself for condemnation. The taking must be needed to meet the
health and welfare goal, which is primarily a legislative determination. 260 The court,
moreover, was adamant that eminent domain could not be exercised simply to create a
more up-to-date or better use of property: "We are of opinion that the Congress, in
legislating for the District of Columbia, has no power to authorize the seizure by eminent
domain of property for the sole purpose of redeveloping the area according to its, or its
26 1
agents', judgment of what a well-developed, well-balanced neighborhood would be."
More descriptively, it noted:
Choice of antiques is a right of property. Or suppose these people own these homes and
can afford none more modem. The poor are entitled to own what they can afford. The
slow, the old, the small in ambition, the devotee of the outmoded have no less right to
property than
have the quick, the young, the aggressive, and the modernistic or
2
26

futuristic.

The Schneider court, however, did not decide that the District of Columbia
263
condemnation was a redevelopment plan that merely reflected taste.
The court summarized the situation as one in which the government characterized
some lands within the project redevelopment area as "slums," but other properties were
not.264 The lower court found that this scenario could also offend the Constitution when
individual tracts of land were examined. To it, the statute only authorized taking of

257. Id.
at 714. Lands ripe for redevelopment are aptly described in Schneider,id.(footnote omitted):
[T]here are sections of cities which are not at the present time used to their fullest economic
possibility, or are not arranged to fit current ideas of city development. An outstanding example is
Trinity Church and its surrounding cemetery at the corner of Wall Street and Broadway in New
York City. Old streets are not so wide as new ones would be. Apartment houses would be more
economically efficient than are single dwellings. Phrases used to describe this situation are
"inadequate planning of the area", "excessive land coverage by the buildings thereon", "defective
design and arrangement of the buildings thereon", "faulty street or lot layout", "economically or
socially undesirable land uses". The statutes dealing with these areas are usually called "urban
redevelopment" laws. The areas are frequently called "blighted". They are in no sense slums, or
similar to slums; they are out-of-date. They do not breed disease or crime; they fail to measure up
to their maximum potential use in terms of economic, social, architectural, or civic desirability.
258. Id. at 715.
259. Id. at 716.
260. Schneider, 117 F. Supp. at 718.
261. Id.at 720; see also id. at 724 ("One man's land cannot be seized by the Government and sold to another
man merely in order that the purchaser may build upon it a better house or a house which better meets the
Government's idea of what is appropriate or well-designed.").
262. ld.at 719.
263. Id.at 724-25.
264. Schneider, 117 F. Supp. at 724-75.
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265
property for "the reasonable necessities of slum clearance and prevention.
Nevertheless, the court dismissed the complaint because the pleadings were facial
challenges to the law, not raising "as applied" issues except for the mention 267
of the
266
It left open the option of amending the pleadings.
properties being commercial.
Against this backdrop of rhetoric in favor of private rights, the decision Justice

Douglas wrote in Berman was a paean to public planning. Justice Douglas's decision is
much shorter than that of the lower court.
Rather than a painstaking review of
precedents, the decision declared its basic premises in an almost staccato fashion: (1)

Congress's power over the District of Columbia is similar to the police power, 268 (2)
legislative determinations define the boundaries of the power, 2 6 9 (3) the judiciary has

little role in oversight, 270 (4) if the end is within the authority of Congress, then
Congress may use the means of eminent domain to reach that end, 2 7 1 and (5) Congress
can choose private development as a means to the end after condemnation. 2 7 2

On its

way to upholding the statute, the Supreme Court made it clear that the "public welfare is
broad and inclusive." 2 7 3 Additionally, the choice of what lands to condemn was that of
the legislature; it was not up to the courts to review which tract of land should or should
27 5
274
No "integrated [plan] for redevelopment"
not be included in the redevelopment.
could ever be accomplished if each tract owner could argue that his or her tract of land

was not being used against the public interest at the time of condemnation. 2 76 Moreover,
unlike the lower court's decision, the Berman Court had no doubt that title to lands could

be taken by condemnation, and that the Redevelopment Act had sufficient standards to
guide the agency. 2 7 7 The Supreme Court unequivocally upheld a redevelopment statute

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id.
Id. at 725.
Id.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 31-32.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 33-34. The Court stated:

Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also
for Congress to determine. Here one of the means chosen is the use of private enterprise for
redevelopment of the area.... The public end may be as well or better served through an agency of
private enterprise than through a department of government-or so the Congress might conclude.
We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of
community redevelopmentprojects.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-34 (emphasis added).
273. Id. at 33 ("The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.").
274. Id. at 35-36.
275. Id. at 35.
276. Id.The Court elaborated:
It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a
particular project area. Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and
character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the
integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36.
277. See id. at 35.
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both in the abstract and as applied. It did none of the agonizing that characterized the
lower court opinion.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Midkiff had no difficulty. It overruled a Ninth
Circuit decision that had invalidated a statute as an unconstitutional taking. 27 8 The
statute sought to remedy a concentration of landownership, which resulted from native
Hawaiian landownership patterns. 27 9 In essence, most residential housing was built on
ground leases, with the home "owner" not having fee title to the land. 2 80 The Hawaii
legislature passed a scheme through which lessees in a residential subdivision could have
the housing authority condemn the land in the subdivision, with the lessee ultimately
providing the purchase money and getting title to the land.281 Only lessees in possession
the
could enlist the procedure, and only one lot could be bought in this manner. 282 To 283
Amendment.
Fifth
the
of
purpose
entire
the
violated
directly
Ninth Circuit, the statute
The decision in Midkiff v. Tom assaulted the statute, harking to the writings of
James Madison, which cautioned about the tyranny of the majority:
As anticipated by Madison, the Hawaii Legislature has become the instrument by which
private property held by a minority of the persons within that state is to be redistributed to
appease the desires of a landless majority to own residential land. The Federal
Constitution and the fifth and fourteenth amendments were adopted with the express
purpose of invalidating the taking of2 84the private property from one person for the private
and exclusive enjoyment by another.
To the circuit, this was a simple case of taking the property of A and giving it to B for
B's private use. 2 85 The court meticulously reviewed prior decisions. It found those
authorizing eminent domain as limited to five situations, namely: (1) when property
would be put to a "historically accepted public use, ' 2 86 (2) the land would change in
use, (3) possession of the land would change, (4) a governmental entity would gain
ownership, or (5) the taking was a "de minimis condemnation ' 287 required for
redevelopment of adjacent land.288 Judicial review of a state public use determination
was not confined to a review of whether the purpose was within the police power; the
289
Ninth Circuit limited the Berman holding to review of Congressional determinations.
278. See Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983), modifiedon mandate, Midkiffv. Tom, 725 F.2d 502
(9th Cir. 1984), rev'dsub nom. Midkiff,467 U.S. 229.
279. Midkiffv. Tom, 483 F. Supp. 62, 65, 67 (D. Haw. 1979).
280. Id. at 65.
281. Hawaii Land Reform Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 516 (1993). The District Court upheld the statute
employing the Berman decision. Midkiff 483 F. Supp. at 67. It held that judicial review was deferential; so
long as a statute was not arbitrary and within the police power of the state, eminent domain could be the means
to meet the end. id. The statute could be justified both on a social desire to forward land distribution or as an
economic measure to curb inflation and control prices of fee land. Id. at 69-70.
282. Midkiff 467 U.S. at 233-34.
283. Midkiff 702 F.2d at 798.
284. Id. at 793.
285. Id. at 798.
286. Id. at 793.
287. Id. at 794.
288. Midkiff 702 F.2d at 793-94.
289. Id. at 796-97. The court also distinguished Berman from the Hawaii case because in the Washington
redevelopment scenario, a public agency acquired title as an interim step before private parties potentially
received the land. Id. at 797.
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Moreover, the court read Berman as focusing on whether non-blighted properties could
be condemned in conjunction
with removal of slums that were injurious to the public
2 90
safety.
and
health
The presence of a concurring and dissenting opinion at the circuit court level
emphasized that the Supreme Court in Midkiff was reviewing a stark rejection of eminent
domain power. Judge Poole's concurrence did not make a detailed analysis of precedent,
but examined the Hawaii Land Reform Statute and found that its only effect was to
transfer property to a private party. 2 91 To Judge Poole, the transfer was not incident to
another public goal, and would not actually ensure an increase in affordable residential
housing. 292 This concurrence, therefore, did not hesitate to declare that the statute
served no public purpose. 293 The dissenting opinion by Judge Ferguson was equally
adamant in the opposite direction, namely, that a court should not substitute its judgment
for that of the legislature; the deference of Berman applied to the legislative
determinations of the state.

294

In light of the lower courts' discussions, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Midkiff
despite her later disavowal in her Kelo dissent, 295 was a broad affirmation of the right to
use eminent domain to meet public purposes despite private parties getting title to the
property condemned. The language is sweeping: "The 'public use' requirement is thus
coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers. ' 2 96 In fact, the decision, in
addition to citing Berman, maintained that "where the exercise of the eminent domain
power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause. ' 2 97 The lower court was
directly chided for reading the Supreme Court's precedents too narrowly, both in
requiring a governmental entity to take title to condemned land (even if momentarily),
and in providing less deference to state legislative determinations of public purpose than
those of Congress. 29 8 Justice O'Connor is correct in Kelo that the Midkiff decision
identifies the harm the condemnation was designed to alleviate, but it did not necessarily
limit the public purpose choice of the state legislature. 299 The Midkiff opinion concluded

290. Id. at 796.
291. See id at 807 (Poole, J., concurring).
292. Midkiff, 702 F.2d at 803-04 (Poole, J., concurring).
293. Id. at 806 ("[W]hen as here the drastic effects of a statute contrast so starkly with its professed goals,
leaving in shadow the nexus of reasonable relationship to those goals, one may question whether a public
purpose in fact exists.").
294. Id. at 813 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). To Judge Ferguson, the appropriate question was not whether
there was a transfer from one private party to another, but the following, id. at 809:
The real question is whether the legislature of Hawaii may, pursuant to a plan carefully tailored to
guarantee due process and just compensation, bring about the redistribution of privately held land
where the legislature has found (a) that the concentration of such land in the hands of a few
landholders is a cause of great social and economic harm to the public and (b) that the distribution
of such land in small parcels to many persons will be to the public's benefit and advantage.
295. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (disavowing language equating the police power and
"public use" as "unnecessary to the specific holdings of those decisions").
296. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
297. Id. at 241.
298. Id. at 243-44.
299. Id. at 245.
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30 0
that eliminating an oligopoly was "a classic exercise of a State's police powers."
Moreover, it also
refused to second-guess the legislature or require proof of the efficacy
30 1
of the statute.
Importantly, the Midkiff Court concluded that there was a market failure, and the
statute in question was not designed to benefit a "particular class of identifiable
individuals ' 3 ° 2 but to remedy that failure. 30 3 The Kelo situation could also be seen as
one in which market failures are addressed. The need to assemble land for large projects
to comprehensively revitalize a city neighborhood displays the classic potential for
hold-out behavior. 3 0 4 Even assuming the Kelo plaintiffs were truly acting out of
principle and not out of economic maneuvering, the scope of the government's powers
cannot be judged by the individual motives of those who would resist the power. 3° 5 Key
to the Kelo affirmation of the exercise of eminent domain were the facts surrounding the
government's planning, which did not include identifying a particular private party to
benefit from development prior to the condemnation.

2.

State Court Interpretations of "Public Use"

Many state courts have interpreted state constitution provisions that are parallel to
the federal prerequisite of "public use" for eminent domain. In some instances, the
courts merely used federal precedents, deciding that the state provisions were congruent
with the federal. 30 6 In other situations, the state court independently construes a state
requirement. 3° 7 Although states have come to varied conclusions, 308 one of the most
discussed series of state decisions has come from Michigan, and therefore that precedent
will be examined most closely. The Michigan Supreme Court in Poletown upheld the
use of eminent domain to condemn a working class neighborhood for a General Motors
factory. 30 9 In the more recent Hathcock decision, the Court overruled Poletown. It held
that eminent domain takings for economic development were not for the public use, but
the decision acknowledged exceptions and thus, in essence, ended up with the same
conclusion as Kelo, namely, that there are no per se rules. The two approaches simply
begin at opposite ends, but meet at the middle.

300. Id. at 242-43.
301. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242-43 ("When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not
irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than debates over
the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal courts.").
302. Id. at 245.
303. See id.
304. See infra, at n. 352-362 and accompanying text.
305. As noted by Justice O'Connor, judging what is the primary motivation of the government is difficult.
See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning why the intent of the government should
be relevant to a takings appraisal). Ascertaining the primary motives of individuals is also difficult; an
objective reasonable expectations test is less subject to gaming to distinguish between private parties in regard
to compensation or other matters.
306. See e.g. San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 100-01 (Cal. 2002).
307. See e.g. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770.
308. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 532 (listing Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, South
Carolina, and Washington as employing a narrow definition of "public use," one which would not include
economic development).
309. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455, overruled,Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765.
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The Michigan Supreme Court decided Poletown on an expedited schedule against
a backdrop of economic crisis. Unemployment was high in Detroit. 3 10 General Motors
had an obsolete plant and would leave Detroit for a suburban or sunbelt location if land
could not be made available to it within Detroit. 311 General Motors had certain criteria
for a plant and a date certain by which it wanted title. 3 12 In view of the urgency, the
majority and the dissent phrased the legal issue in diametrically opposed fashion. The
five-member per curiam decision spoke of the need to reach a public end, emphasizing
employment goals. 3 13 The two dissents underscored that private property was being
taken for the use of another private party; 3 14 as Justice Ryan put it: "Stripped of the
justifying adornments which have universally attended public description of this
controversy, the central jurisprudential issue is the right of government to expropriate
property from those who do not wish to sell for the use and benefit of a strictly private
3 15

corporation."
Nevertheless, the Poletown majority upheld the taking, conflating "public use" and
"public purpose":
We are persuaded the terms have been used interchangeably in Michigan statutes and
decisions in an effort to describe the protean concept of public benefit. The term "public
use" has not received a narrow or inelastic definition by this Court in prior cases. Indeed,
this Court has stated that "'[a] public use changes with changing conditions of society"'
and that "'[t]he right of the public to receive and enjoy the benefit of the use determines
' 3 16
whether the use is public or private.
An increase in jobs or positive impact on the commercial or retail base of the city alone
would not earn blanket approval of condemnations that granted title to specified private
parties. The key to the Court's approval in Poletown was a finding that the purpose was
essentially public, with only incidental benefit to the private interest. 3 17 Indeed, the
3 19
318
after a "heightened scrutiny."
majority found the benefit "clear and significant"

310. In the words of dissenting Justice Ryan, it was of "calamitous proportions." Id. at 465 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting) (citing unemployment rates of eighteen percent in Detroit, rising to thirty percent among African
Americans).
311. Id. at 466.
312. Id. at465-67.
313. Id. at 457. The per curiam opinion asked:
Can a municipality use the power of eminent domain granted to it by the Economic Development
Corporations Act, to condemn property for transfer to a private corporation to build a plant to
promote industry and commerce, thereby adding jobs and taxes to the economic base of the
municipality and state?
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457 (citations omitted).
314. Id. at 460 (Fitzgerald & Ryan, JJ., dissenting); id. at 464-65 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
315. Id. at471.
316. Id. at 457 (footnotes omitted, brackets in original).
317. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459. As one commentator describes the decision, "[y]ou had to have been in
Detroit at the time to understand [it]." William A. Fischel, The PoliticalEconomy of Public Use in Poletown:
How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 929, 953. There
was overwhelming community support and sense of need. See id. at 953-54. Moreover, the federal
government contributed to the costs with dedicated grants, therefore reducing the political exposure of the local
officials. See id. at 954.
318. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459. In fact, the terms "clear and significant" are repeated, id. at 459-60
(emphasis added):
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The dissenting opinions disagreed. Of the two dissents, that of Justice Ryan is the
most interesting, because the Michigan Supreme Court eventually adopted his position in
Hathcock. Justice Ryan devoted several pages to delineating how General Motors
dictated what land would be acquired, and on what terms General Motors would build a
factory.32 Land the public obtained for $200 million would be sold to General Motors
for $8 million. 32 1 There was no guarantee that the proposed six thousand jobs would
materialize and be maintained. 322 Therefore, he opined that the project was primarily to
benefit a private, profit-driven entity.323 This, in itself, would not make it impossible to
uphold the use of eminent domain, but he found that precedents would only allow
condemnation for a private corporation under what he referred to as the "instrumentality
of commerce exception." 324 He further delineated three situations in which this
exception could operate: "1) public necessity of the extreme sort, 2) continuing
accountability to the public, and 3) selection of land according to facts of independent
public significance. ' 325 Justice Ryan found none of these exceptional circumstances
326
existed in the Poletown scenario.
More than twenty years later, the Michigan Supreme Court would abandon
Poletown's "heightened scrutiny" test and adopt these criteria, albeit not as exceptions to
a ban on eminent domain, but as glosses on the definition of "public use.' 327 The
condemnation at issue was an aggregation of land for a technology and business park
referred to as the "Pinnacle Project." 32 8 Because the project did not have any of the
validating characteristics, the Court found no justification for the condemnation in
Hathcock.329 The Court expressly overruled Poletown, labeling the earlier case an
aberration in takings law because it allowed the incidental benefits from a profit-seeking
corporation's private ownership of land to be a public use. 33
The Michigan
Constitution, ratified in 1963, only allowed taking of private property for "public
use." 33 1 The majority defined the term in the manner that a person sophisticated in the

If the public benefit was not so clear andsignificant,we would hesitate to sanction approval of such
a project. The power of eminent domain is restricted to furthering public uses and purposes and is
not to be exercised without substantial proof that the public is primarily to be benefited. Where, as
here, the condemnation power is exercised in a way that benefits specific and identifiable private
interests, a court inspects with heightened scrutiny the claim that the public interest is the
predominant interest being advanced. Such public benefit cannot be speculative or marginal but
must be clearand significant if it is to be within the legitimate purpose as stated by the Legislature.
319. Id.
320. Id.
at 468-70 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
321. Id. at469.
322. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 471.
323. See id.
324. ld.at 477.
325. Id. at 478 (emphasis in original).
326. Id,at 480.
327. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781. In his concurrence, Justice Cavanagh would use Justice Ryan's
analysis directly. Id. at 799 (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
328. Id.at 770.
329. Id. at 788.
330. Id.at 786-87 (characterizing Poletown as the only case "holding that a vague economic benefit
stemming from a private profit-maximizing enterprise is a 'public use').
331. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784. The Court read Poletown as asserting that the plaintiff acknowledged
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law would have interpreted its meaning in 1963; this would encompass the existing
Michigan legal precedents. 332 Therefore, if a private party was to gain title to land, only
in the three situations Justice Ryan detailed would the resulting land use constitute
public use.
The majority opinion explicated the dimensions of the three situations where
private title-taking did not interfere with public use. The first, extreme public necessity,
related to "instrumentalities of commerce." 33 3 Railroads, pipelines, and highways
epitomized this group; location is important in these projects, with little flexibility to
maneuver around a hold-out, making collective action through condemnation
necessary. 334 In the second gloss, there could be public use and eminent domain if a
public entity retained sufficient control to ensure the public was accommodated, such as
with a regulated industry. 3 35 Third, the Court identified the situation where a public
purpose drives the choice of lands to be condemned, independent of what use the lands
will be put to after condemnation, with slum clearance listed as an example. 336 The
Hathcock approach contained a fact-dependent appraisal of a condemnation's propriety.
With this reversal of Poletown, the Court repudiated one methodologyheightened scrutiny-and one holding in one case. Many had criticized the Poletown
result, which uprooted a thriving community and possibly displaced as many jobs as it
potentially could create. 337 General Motors Corporation was not required to sustain the
factory and the jobs; all decisions were left to the board of directors of the private
company. 338 The majority in Hathcock was thus emboldened to apply its decision
retroactively to pending condemnation actions. 339 Nevertheless, there was no bright line
that automatically precluded a condemnation for economic development.
The glosses on the definition of "public use," especially the finding of public use if
a govemment entity retained control to assure the public benefit, could end up justifying
many condemnations designed to "upgrade" land-use. 340 For example, in Kelo the
redevelopment agency was to retain title to the land; it would be developed pursuant to
that "public use" and "public purpose" were the same and that the question was whether there was sufficient
"public" benefit when such benefit was incidental to the private benefit. Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d
at 458).
332. Id. at 783. Justice Weaver's concurring opinion took a different tack. The ordinary understanding of a
ratifier would govern. Id at 788-89 (Weaver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This would require
some actual public "use," access, or control of the property condemned except when the controlling purpose of
the land acquisition was to remove slums. See id. at 796. There would be no need to be "elitist"; ordinary
people could understand the dimension of rights that have been central to liberty through time. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d at 798-99 (Weaver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although the majority's result was
deemed correct in this interest, Justice Weaver could not endorse the method. Id.
333. Id. at 781.
334. Id. at 781-82.
335. See id. at 782.
336. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782-83.
337. See Somin, supra n. 240 at 1016-18 (describing large business dislocation from the condemnation
approved in Poletown).
338. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J., dissenting). In fact, the jobs did not materialize as promised.
Somin, supra n. 240, at 1013. However, there were three-thousand workers in the plant, and property tax
revenue was higher than anticipated because of the value of robotic equipment installed. Richard H. Chused,
Cases, Materials,and Problems in Property 935 (2d ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 1999).
339. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 787-88.
340. See Somin, supra n. 240, at pt. II (cautioning that the exceptions could swallow the rule).
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long-term leases that contained specific requirements. 34 1 Although the example of a
regulated utility was provided in Hathcock as illustrative of this category, if covenants or
leasing is sufficient public control, more acquisitions could qualify for condemnation.
Similarly, as is further discussed below, condemnation might be allowable under the
rationale of "extreme public necessity," and in instances where land is chosen for
condemnation to remedy some blight or nuisance-like activity existing on the land.
Therefore, although Justice Stevens cites the Hathcock case as one in which states give
greater protection to private rights under a state constitution than what is being
forwarded in Kelo,3 42 the decision Justice Stevens authored is not that different in result
from the Hathcock decision. The Hathcock Court simply begins by questioning any
condemnation that results in private ownership with perhaps a presumption of invalidity.
The Kelo Court begins with a presumption that the legislature or local entity has
exercised the condemnation power legitimately. Both decisions reject per se rules.
3.

Kelo and Practical Reality

Takings law, be it regulatory takings or eminent domain, is not known for its
clarity. The Fifth Amendment requirement that no private property be taken for public
use without just compensation, seemingly only requires compensation. The words "for
public use" could be merely descriptive of eminent domain; the power of a sovereign to
commandeer property had long been acknowledged and the requirement of
compensation was the primary limitation intended. 34 3 Therefore, it is not surprising that
determinations of what is "public use" would proceed by ad hoc rules. The element of
uncertainty and the potential for judicial line-drawing are cited criticisms of this
approach, 344 but it is inevitable in any attempt to review political decision-making. Per
se rules do not eliminate the concern.
345
In fact, a per se rule, such as contained in Justice O'Connor's dissent in Kelo,
could engender as much judicial lee-way to the political sphere as the majority opinion,
which rejects the concept of outlawing condemnations simply because the purpose is
economic development with private participation. Justice O'Connor would require a
pre-existing "evil" to exist, and therefore, would not uphold a condemnation that simply
seeks to "upgrade" land use. 34 6 However, in so doing she focuses on the existing use of
individual tracts of land, rather than on societal ills or harms that might need remedying

341. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 544-45.
In Berman, a contract required the developers to implement the
redevelopment plan. 348 U.S. at 30 (cited in Kelo, 125 U.S. at 2666 n. 15).
342. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668, 2668 n. 22.
343. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1056 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that it
was not clear that colonial governments compensated when taking land for highways and other purposes, and
that states continued to not compensate through the eighteenth century); but see Dana & Merrill, supra n. 11,
at 17-18 (arguing compensation was the rule, except perhaps in rural areas where road-building increased the
value of the land remaining in the possession of the private owner).
344. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing there is no principled way to apply the
majority's opinion).
345. Justice Thomas's dissent presents a different problem. He contends that he avoids the line-drawing
problem inherent in a "public purpose" test by requiring an "actual use" test, admonishing that the latter is
easier to administer. Id. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
346. Id. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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in the greater New London area. It is true, as Justice O'Connor notes, that the
well-maintained houses of the plaintiffs in Kelo were not the source of any social
harm. 347 Neither, however, was the department store in Berman, nor the individual
tracts of land condemned for individual lessees in Midkiff
Therefore, Justice
O'Connor's test could not explain existing precedents on the tract-by-tract basis.
Moreover, creating any rule in advance and drawing a bright line can lead to
situations in which legislative ends are simply recast. Justice O'Connor referred to the
"stupid staffer" 34 8 as the only potential violator of Justice Kennedy's test ferreting out
impermissible intentions for condemnation. 349 However, Justice Scalia, in first invoking
the stupid staffer, was faulting a test that distinguished between harm-preventing and
benefit-conferring governmental actions; 35 this is just the type of distinction that Justice
O'Connor seems to be presenting.
She would outlaw condemnations for the
benefit-granting activity of economic development, yet approve condemnations that are
designed to right an existing wrong.
In addition to inviting linguistic gymnastics, per se rules invite strategic behavior
on the part of state and municipal governments. 35 1 The actual breadth and scope of a
governmental action might change to shoehorn it into the proper category. For example,
a development plan could become greater than initially conceived in order to take in
properties that are more objectively blighted. Condemnation, however, might be needed
to solve other market problems.
In order to proceed with development, tract assembly is often required. Highways,
railroads, and pipelines are easy examples of projects that are location dependent; while
there are perhaps numerous choices in a broad goal of going from New York to Boston,
once a highway or pipeline is begun to be laid out, deviation around reluctant land sellers
becomes more and more difficult. Each and every landowner on the chosen route will
hold a keystone necessary to complete the project. Therefore, landowners could have
economic reasons to "hold out" and attempt to garner a profit, beyond the intrinsic worth
of the actual property, namely a "monopoly rent." 352 At some point, a bi-lateral
monopoly could result; there will only be one seller available and the land will only be
suitable for inclusion in the project. It is not only transportation links, however, that are
dependent on land assembly. Flexibility for governmental land acquisition is therefore
necessary.
Practical realities can affect more projects than transportation. One example is a
353
piece of land within the confines of a battlefield or other site of historic relevance.
The value the land in its current use as a farm, or in conversion to residences, might
347. Id at 2675.
348. Id. (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 n. 12) (internal quotation marks and bracket omitted).
349. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
350. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 n. 12.
351. James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 859, 865 (arguing
governmental entities will structure activities to meet the definitions even if not otherwise required).
352. A "monopoly rent "is the difference in value between the price achievable selling the land for other uses
(the "opportunity cost") and the special value to the government or transportation utility. Dana &
Merrill, supra n. 11, at 29-30.
353. See Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668. This case, often cited for its broad definition of public
purpose, involved an actual government use of the condemned land for a battlefield memorial. Id. at 669.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2005

33

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 41 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 6

TULSA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 41:243

bring one price, similar to other lands of like kind. To the government, however, the
particular piece of land is the only land that could meet its need. Therefore, if
condemnation were not available, the landowner could demand monopoly rent. 354 The
Hathcock Court insisted that a business and technology center was not a development
that required a particular location and condemnation to avoid hold-outs, pointing to the
number of centers that get built without condemnation. 355 There is, however, no way to
actually count those centers that have not been constructed because of land assemblage
difficulties. 356 As a practical matter, once assemblage begins, there are less and less
ways to complete a project, and location becomes key even for office complexes, hotels,
factories, and other undertakings that initially do not seem to command location
sensitivity. Suggestions to avoid hold-outs -and other strategic behavior by sellers
35 7
without condemnation include secret negotiations and favored nation clauses.
Favored nation clauses would require the purchaser to pay an early seller the same price
paid later sellers. These contracts could potentially spread the "windfall" from increased
property values derived from the change of use, but secret negotiations and other tactics,
such as the use of dummy purchasers, smack of deception and underhandedness that
could engender a taste as bitter as condemnation in the mouths of sellers.
Moreover, the need to assemble land for purposeful redevelopment is most acute in
cities, rather than in undeveloped rural areas. 358 Land ownership is subdivided into lots.
Existing conflicting uses are more numerous.
Individual owners each become
increasingly important as the lay-out progresses.
The argument over whether
development of Parcel 3 in the Fort Trumbull project could have proceeded, leaving in
place the plaintiffs' homes, is instructive. The expert for the landowners cited the
contiguity of the homes and the possibility of reorienting the new buildings. 359 The City
countered by noting the geological and environmental challenges already existing on the
development tract. 36
It essentially alleged that adding the design constraint of
accommodating the existing homes would be a proverbial straw breaking the camel's
back.36 1 Missing pieces at the center of a development site obviously would cause
problems, but even at the edges it can be difficult to re-align the proposed activity.
Because of these practical difficulties, state and local governments have relied on the

354. See Dana & Merrill, supra n. 11, at 29-30.
355. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783-84.
356. See Fischel, supra n. 317, at 947. For an example of difficulties in assemblage, see Terry Pristin,
Square Feet; Eminent Domain Revisited: A Minnesota Case, 155 N.Y. Times C9 (Oct. 5, 2005) (detailing
hold-outs requiring condemnation to complete headquarters for the national chain, Best Buy, and the public
benefits of the project).
357. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 n. 24 (acknowledging the debate over whether or not condemnation is
needed for profitable projects or whether they could be forwarded by other means); Somin, supra n. 240,
at 1026-27 (arguing hold-out problems can be avoided by using secret negotiations or using agents or through
"favored nation" clauses in contracts).
358. That, of course, was Detroit's problem in Poletown: in order to build a plant on one floor to suit more
modem production techniques, General Motors needed more land than its current location in Detroit. See
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 466. It was therefore attracted to suburbs. See id. at 466-67; see also Kelo, 125
S. Ct. at 2668 n. 24 (noting the argument that older and smaller cities have the greatest need for condemnation).
359. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 553.
360. Id.at 554 n. 82.
361. Id. at 554-55.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol41/iss2/6

34

Mansfield: Takings and Threes: The Supreme Court's 2004-2005 Term

2005]

TAKINGS AND THREES

availability of condemnation when planning and incurring financing costs. 362 Public
expectations would need changes to be prospective.
D.

Expectations and Compensation

Private expectations about property ownership also must factor into any discussion
of eminent domain. One utilitarian definition of property defines it as the expectation of
deriving an advantage from control over a thing; law, however, is crucial to the
formation of such an expectation. 363 Nevertheless, these expectations, arising out of
law, are always subject to the law of the land. 364 The law has always included the right
of eminent domain, which allows the government to take private property, but under the
Fifth Amendment, upon the payment of just compensation. This right has been a
constant and thus, should always color a private party's expectations. The dimensions of
what it is reasonableto expect as a public use of property, and hence the possibilities for
eminent domain impacting on a particular citizen, have changed over time.36 5 Without
assuming the drafters of the Constitution intended to freeze reality as of the date of
ratification of the Fifth Amendment, looking closer at the just compensation component
may reconcile the two sets of expectations-the public and the private.
Some might question why there is ever a problem with eminent domain if
compensation is required. A monetary payment in theory would make the private
property owner "whole," as dollars are substituted for the real property. Wholeness,
however, does not always result from the payment. 366 As Justice Ryan in his Poletown
dissent succinctly put it:

362. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 799 (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 800
(Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
363. Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation 112-13 (R. Hildreth trans., 4th ed., Trubner & Co. 1882). The
author states:
The idea of property consists in an established expectation .... Now this expectation ...can

only be the work of law. I cannot count upon the enjoyment of that which I regard as mine, except
through the promise of the law which guarantees it to me.

Property and law are born together, and die together.
Id.Felix Cohen phrases it thusly: Private property is that to which the following sign can be placed: "To the
world: Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold. Signed: Private citizen.
Endorsed: The state." Felix S. Cohen, Dialogueon PrivateProperty, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 357, 374 (1954).
364. See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of Englandbk. 2, 393 (J.B. Lippincott Co. 1898).
Blackstone comments:
[T]he right of property; [is] that sole and despotic dominion ... over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.
[It] consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all [a person's] acquisitions, without any
control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.
Id.; id. atbk. I, 107 (emphasis added).
365. See Maria E. Mansfield, "By The Dawn's Early Light:" The Administrative State Still Stands After
the 2000 Supreme Court Term (Commerce Clause, Delegation,and Takings), 37 Tulsa L. Rev. 205, pt. V(C)(2)
(2001) (arguing that expectations of regulation change over time and influence regulatory takings calculus).
366. Frank Michelman labeled uncompensated costs "demoralization costs." Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 1165, 1214 (1967). He included not only the personal losses, but the investments landowners forego
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Eminent domain is a far more intrusive power [than taxation]. Like taxation, it can entail
financial loss, although "just compensation" is required. But more important, it can entail,
as it did in this case, intangible losses, such as severance or personal attachments to one's
domicile and neighborhood 3 and
the destruction of an organic community of a most unique
67
and irreplaceable character.
This leads to people not holding-out for greater economic return from purchasers, 368 but
desiring to "holdin" 369 on their property.
No one can seriously doubt that real property can have a personal side that an
existing use strengthens. Some of the plaintiffs in Kelo were poster children for
sympathetic treatment. Susette Kelo owned her house since 1997 and had made
numerous improvements. 3 70 Mr. and Mrs. Dery had even more compelling attachments:
Wilhelmina Dery was born in their house in 1918, and her husband Charles lived there
for sixty years. 3 71 One needs little imagination to envision the family memories set in
the house. While the Derys provided the most drama, the other plaintiffs either resided
on the property or actively managed rental property. 3 72 It is always more disruptive to
interfere with existing uses than those that are simply planned. 373 The traditional
eminent domain standard for compensation does not address the loss of place and
37 4
personality.
Generally, just compensation has been interpreted as requiring payment of fair
market value. The standard gauges fair market value for the highest and best use without
reference to the governmental project. 3 75 In other words, the owner of the condemned

because of the possibility of condemnation. Id.at 1237, 1237 n. 122. See also Nicole Stelle Gamett, The
Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 934, pt. I(A) (2003) (describing the shortfall between fair market value and an owner's full loss). Nevertheless, some elements of the condemned
owner's costs are sometimes paid because of statutory requirements. See Fischel, supra n. 317, at 950-51
(detailing the $15,000 relocation payments, mortgage rate and property tax assistance, and move-out bonus
offered to residents of the Poletown area).
367. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 481 (Ryan, J., dissenting). This increment of value is the personal valuation
of the property, which can be "confiscated." Coniston Corp v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464
(7th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that eminent domain "in effect confiscates the additional (call it 'personal') value
that [many landowners] obtain from the property"). See Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain
Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 957, 958-59 (identifying three uncompensated components: (1) the amount the
landowner's valuation of the property exceeds fair market value, (2) the loss of the possibility of reaping a
surplus above this subjective valuation in trade, and (3) the loss of autonomy in deciding when or whether
to sell).
368. See Justice O'Connor's description of the petitioners in Kelo. 125 S. Ct. at 2672 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (depicting petitioners as not "hold-outs" seeking more money, but as objectors on principle to the
nature of the condemnation).
369. Fennell, supra n. 367, at 979 (quoting Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry:
Communities and ndividuals in Law and Economics, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 75, 128-29 (2004)).
370. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. The trial court noted that she loved the view from her property and its
proximity to water. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 511.
371. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. The house had been in her family for one hundred years. Id. at 2671
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
372. Id.
at 2660. The owner or a family member resided on a total of ten parcels, and five were investment
properties. Id.
373. See Mansfield, supra n. 1,at 465-69 (arguing for a "strong expectation test" to determine valid existing
rights under the Surface Mining Reclamation Act); Rose, supra n. 1, at 275-77 (discussing grandfathering
existing uses inenvironmental law generally).
374. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood,34 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1982).
375. See U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946); U.S. v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
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3 76
property is not to receive the increment of gain connected with the change of use.
Fair market value, however, is based on the price that a willing buyer, who is not
compelled to buy, would pay a willing seller, who is not compelled to sell.
Condemnation is the opposite of this paradigm. Not only is the seller not willing to sell
by definition, the governmental agency, to a certain extent, is not a willing buyer, that is,
in regard to a particular tract within a larger project area. Once a plan is decided upon
and the acquisitions have begun, the agency is relatively locked in. The Fifth
Amendment, however, does not reference fair market value.
3 77
Just compensation could arguably be tied to a different standard or formula.
Moreover, it need not be one fixed value or method in all circumstances. For example,
rates for utilities, in order to pass constitutional muster, must be at "just and reasonable
rates." 3 78 Because a regulated utility is not able to collect revenue without a rate, if the
rate is set too low, a confiscatory taking of the utility's capital will result. 379 However,
there is no one method or "perfect" rate that is required; there is a "range of
reasonableness" 380 for a rate that will satisfy the constitutional requirement.38 1
Similarly, when there is greater interference with expectations of what the line is
between eminent domain powers and private rights, compensation can be raised. Unlike
Justice Thomas, most people do recognize that the complexity of life and the need for
382
governmental intervention is not what it was at the end of the eighteenth century.
The eighteenth century, however, could provide a starting point to gauge people's
expectations.
At that date, government could clearly condemn land when the
government was directly going to use the land.3 83 Therefore, any reasonable expectation
about property rights acknowledged the private right was subject to the sovereign's right
of eminent domain for direct governmental or public use. 384 No adjustment upward

376. See Causby, 328 U.S. 256; Miller, 317 U.S. 369. One proposal to remedy the economic development
dilemma is to value the taken land at the higher value use when "naked" transfers to private parties are
involved. Krier & Serkin, supra n. 351, at 873.
377. In Kelo, Justice Stevens noted the question of compensation was "important" but the case did not raise
the issue. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 n. 21 (responding to amicus briefs arguing for increased compensation to
homeowners for subjective losses).
378. Fed. Power Commn. v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 595 (1944).
379. See DuquesneLight Co. v. Barasch,488 U.S. 299 (1989).
380. Id. at312.
381. Id; Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 602 (averring "not theory but the impact of the rate order which
counts"). Rates are generally geared to a reasonable return on investment, not fair market value, but the
analogy is possible because the constitutional prohibition against uncompensated takings provides the ultimate
standard to judge the appropriateness of a rate.
382. But see Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 Mich. St. L.
Rev. 877, 881 (arguing that it was policy that led to the "evolving, elastic, or deferential" interpretations of
public use, and that policy could be reversed).
383. Regulation alone could not rise to an exercise of eminent domain. In colonial times, land was
regulated, often requiring specific uses of property owned in fee; the law regulated both what could or could
not take place on property. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1252, 1281 (1996); see also Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting
Holdings in the Supreme Court's Taking Cases, 38 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1099, 1122 (1997). Interestingly,
when the subject is regulatory takings, the conservative Justices cite theory and practice at the time of
constitutional adoption as "entirely irrelevant" and the more liberal Justices chide this failure to conform
current holdings to such understanding. CompareLucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 n. 15 (Scalia, J.) with id at 1055-60
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
384. See Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367, 371-75 (1875) (finding eminent domain to be inherent in the concept of
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from fair market value would be needed. 385 Similarly, a reasonable person would most
likely expect that the sovereign could condemn on behalf of, or delegate condemnation
power to, hospitals, railroads, pipelines and other utilities, or businesses with a duty to
provide service to the public. 3 86 This extension of the "strict" use by the public test has
been existent long enough to become part of common understanding. 387 In fact, Justice
O'Connor, Justice Thomas, and the Hathcock Court would include such condemnations
within the rubric of "public use." 388 It is when condemnations move beyond these safe
3 89
harbors that expectations of private property owners become of greater concern.
The next subset of common condemnations involves slum clearance or blight
removal. In theory, these condemnations are targeted at ending obstacles to the health
and safety of the public. 39 If ending harmful activities was the sole aim, then the
government could exercise its police power, simply enjoin the nuisance-creating activity,
and pay no compensation at all. 39 1 However, if the governmental agency transfers title
from the prior owner, some compensation must be paid.3 92 The alignment of slum
clearance and nuisance abatement, however, would temper a private party's expectation
that the current use of the property could continue without some interference from the
government or neighbors; private property rights never encompassed the right to
maintain a nuisance. 39 3 Loss of title, nevertheless, might be unexpected. Therefore,
even for lands truly blighted or containing slum conditions, some adjustment upward
from pure fair market value might be appropriate to correspond to property owner
expectations. Not all properties condemned for slum clearance, however, fall into this
nuisance-causing category.
When a property is condemned under the rubric of slum clearance or blight
removal, the property itself might not be in that condition. The department store in
Berman is illustrative. Although inclusion in the redevelopment project may be
necessary and condemnation available, at this point the individual property owner may
have made investments to keep the property from falling into disrepair. If these were not

sovereignty); see also Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. at 681 (holding power of condemnation need not be
expressly granted to Congress but is implied from other powers granted).
385. Nevertheless, condemning authorities often offer more than fair market value in negotiations in order to
avoid the costs of having to actually condemn the property. Fischel, supra n. 317, at 934 (listing costs of
attorneys, appraisers, hearing appeals, and trials).
386. The federal government has authorized condemnation by interstate pipelines in 1938. 15 U.S.C.
§ 717f(h) (2000). Only recently has Congress authorized the same on behalf of interstate electric transmission
lines. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(e) (West Supp. 2005) (as amended by the Electricity Modernization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 5904 (2005)).
387. Compare Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (understanding of a ratifier sophisticated in the law at the time
of ratification governs meaning of "public use" in the Michigan Constitution) with id. at 788-89 (Weaver, J.,
dissenting) (understanding of an ordinary ratifier would govern interpretation).
388. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2681-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781-82 (allowing condemnation for extreme public necessity, related to
"instrumentalities of commerce").
389. Krier & Serkin, supra n. 351, at 861 (noting a continuum between a public use that is literally open to
all, and a naked transfer, in which the public is excluded and there is no indirect public benefit).
390. See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
391. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (holding nuisance law to be a pre-existing condition on private title).
392. This would be a physical appropriation. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982).
393. SeeLucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32.
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made strategically in order to avoid condemnation or to increase condemnation return,
then the investments would most likely have been made with the expectation of
continuing to own the property. Because the property itself would not be in a
nuisance-like condition, it would be reasonable to some extent to expect that private
ownership would not be interrupted. Therefore, fair market value alone might not
be just.
Another situation that might require more than fair market value would be
economic redevelopment condemnations. As land, especially in developed areas,
becomes harder and harder to assemble in large tracts, community revitalization requires
the possibility of condemnation to advance the public good. Nevertheless, when other
private parties will also directly benefit from the land acquisition, and the public benefit
arises from the improved economic or aesthetic climate attendant with the private gain,
the original owner of the property might be surprised that the government eminent
domain power includes this redistribution. At this end of the continuum, reasonable
expectations about property rights might require an addition to fair market value in
compensation.
Additional increments of compensation are tied to the strength of reasonable
expectations about the breadth of the condemnation power; these expectations may
change over time to reflect common understandings about the interrelationship of public
and private expectations about property. 394 This adjustment of compensation imports
elements of the regulatory taking calculus from the ad hoe appraisal of the so-called
Penn Central factors, namely, the nature of the governmental purpose, the degree of
impact on the regulated, and the interference with the claimant's reasonable,
investment-backed expectations. 395
The mechanics of how much additional
compensation is needed can be a judicial or legislative decision; what controls is that the
compensation must be "just," and to be just requires consideration of the currently
uncompensated costs when condemnations veer from past expectations.
When
condemnations remained tied to highways, post offices, and provision of services to the
public, it was more likely that each member of society had some approximation of
reciprocity from the taking, considering other takings of similar kind and the provision of
services. 396 A formulaic adjustment to fair market value would be more realistic than
determining the subjective value of the property to the current owner. 397 Objective

394. Mansfield, supra n. 365, at pt. V(C)(2).
395. See Penn C. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104. Another aspect of the factors, namely the nature of the

government interest, has been examined in the condemnation and compensation setting. When the need for
condemnation increases because the markets are "thin" (more monopolistic), the government's purpose
becomes stronger, and the need for extra condemnations less. Fennell, supra n. 367, at 990-91 (noting that thin

markets also could increase subjective attachment to property).
396. Of course, if a regulation provides "reciprocity of advantage" and does not result in physical
appropriation or title change, the regulation will not be a taking.

See Claeys, supra n. 382, at 923-926

(discussing Mill Acts with requirements to compensate at a percentage above damages as reciprocity cases);
Krier & Serkin, supra n. 351, at 866 (arguing there is less of a compensation short fall in "classic public use"
cases because benefits clearly accrue to public at large, including the condemnee, who also benefits from
condemnations of other people's land); Mansfield, supra n. 28, at 279; Mansfield, supran. 1, at 445.
397. See U.S. v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979). The Supreme Court recognized that it adopted

a relatively objective fair market value rule "[b]ecause of serious practical difficulties in assessing the worth an
individual places on particular property at a given time." 1d. at 511.
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reasonable property expectations about the likelihood of condemnation for the public
purpose forwarded would determine whether a particular condemnee would receive
3 98
additional compensation pursuant to the formula.
Compensation beyond fair market value in economic development and slum
redevelopment condemnations also could alleviate one major criticism of past exercises
of the condemnation power, namely, the disparate impact such projects have had on the
poor and minority population.39 9 Often, the development replacing the condemned
property does not serve the direct needs of the displaced. For example, removing
existing substandard housing did not result in a substitution of affordable up-to-standard
housing in the District of Columbia. 40 0 Similarly, the plaintiffs in Kelo would be
unlikely to afford substitute housing with a comparable water view; residences in the
economic development area were to be high-end.40 1 Moreover, often in the past
absolutely no development took place and condemnation lead to empty lots.
Increased compensation might lead to greater scrutiny by the condemning
authorities before undertaking a course of action. Typically, voters, and hence their
representatives, will want to get their "money's worth" for a project. Adding to the cost
of projects expands the basic "fiscal illusion' '4 2 justification for compensation, which
argues that internalizing the costs of a project by requiring compensation will provide a
cautionary brake on governmental activity. 4 03 Because the traditional fair market value
standard of compensation leaves many of the costs of a condemnation uncompensated,
these costs are externalities to the decision-maker. A truer cost-benefit analysis would
4 4
reveal whether alternative uses for taxpayer moneys might be more appropriate. 0
A sliding scale of compensation, from fair market value to some multiplier thereof,
can supplement the other restraints on takings for economic development implicit in the
majority and concurring opinions in Kelo. The majority emphasized it was approving a
"Icarefully considered". '405 development plan, which was not intended "'to benefit a

398. The determination of "just compensation" is a judicial function. Dana & Merrill, supra n. 11,at 5.
Therefore, courts would still need to determine fair market value and the propriety of use of a multiplier even if
the legislature sets varying degrees of multipliers for use in different situations.
399. In the General Motors factory scenario of Poletown, however, those who did not leave were primarily
elderly. Fischel, supra n. 317, at 950-52. The hold-out population differed from the money-accepting
population based more on age, which could reflect flexibility to starting over. Id.
400. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 689 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Danaher, J., dissenting) (noting the
displacement of prior tenants from the area razed in Berman); see also Somin, supra n. 240, at 1037 (arguing
that in the Berman-approved redevelopment, only 300 of the 5,900 new homes built on site were affordable to
prior residents of area). A separate problem is how to take into account the interests of tenants, especially
low-income residential renters. Id.at 1036-39.
401. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 537-38. Somin, supra n. 240, at 1035-36 (detailing that blight removal has not
served residents of the blighted area; by 1963, over 600,000 lost homes and most ended up living in worse
conditions than before).
402. Dana & Merrill, supra n. 11,at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
403. See id.at 41-46; Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of
Takings, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 999 (1999).
404. The availability of federal money can skew decision making; if the federal funds are earmarked and not
available for alternative uses, the local decisionmakers will not truly be seeking the greatest return for the
moneys. Fischel, supra n. 317, at 943-44 (arguing federal money for the General Motors project influenced
local decisionmaking and the project might not have proceeded without the money).
405. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661 (quoting Kelo, 843 A.2d at 536).
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particular class of identifiable individuals. -406 Justice Kennedy stressed that even under
a rational basis test, some takings would not pass muster:
A court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause should strike
down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private party, with
only incidental or pretextual public benefits, just as a court applying rational-basis review
under the Equal Protection Clause must strike down a government classification that is
clearly intended to injure a particular
class of private parties, with only incidental or
40 7
pretextual public justifications.
Both process and substantive restraint governs condemnation. The importance of
requiring planning is that the proposal will get public vetting. Weaknesses will be
exposed.408 The substantive concern with neither harming nor benefiting particular
individuals as a primary goal reflects a similar concern with zoning. General zoning
activities are usually constitutional, but spot zoning is suspect. 4° 9 The requirement to
have the public benefit be more than pretextual for certain condemnations also is
reminiscent of Justice Stevens's test for when a regulatory taking exists. He would
uphold laws of general applicability and only invalidate laws that target particular
properties.410
Even without expressly adopting this regulatory takings test, Kelo provides that
"aberrations ''4 11 can be discovered and condemnations invalidated. 4 12 The federal
courts have held condemnations unconstitutional for failure to meet the public use
standard.4 13 Meaningful ad hoc judicial review together with awarding more than fair
market value in certain circumstances should curb both the tyranny of the majority and
that of the minority.

406. Id. at 2661-62 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245).
407. Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
408. The field will not necessarily be level between supporters and detractors of any project involving
condemnation. Relative political clout, wealth, and the dispersal of benefits as opposed to the concentration of
costs often render those opposing condemnation at a disadvantage. Publicity, however, can derail starkly
unfair activities. See Ely, supra n. 247, at 857 (discussing the perception that eminent domain has been used
"to benefit corporations and developers at the expense of homeowners and small businesses" (footnote
omitted)).
409. Compare Village of Euclid v.Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 36 (1926) (upholding generalized zoning)
with Chrismon v. Guilford County, 370 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1988) (discussing differing state approaches to the
practice of re-zoning in a manner that singles out a particular property from the surrounding uses; "spot
zoning" deemed a term of art that in some jurisdictions leads to automatic invalidity).
410. See Palazzolo v. RI., 533 U.S. 606, 640 n. 3 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1071-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Another commentator notes that the Lingle case,
with its concentration on "'how any regulatory burden is distributed among property owners,"' also implicates
the general versus particular analysis. Echeverria, supra n. 1, at 10583 (quoting Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2076)
(emphasis omitted).
411. 125 S.Ct. at 2667 n. 17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
412. Seeid. at2666-67.
413. See Daniels v. Area Plan Commn. ofAllen County, 306 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2002); Cottonwood Christian
Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002); 99 Cents Only Stores v.
LancasterRedevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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THE LINGLE AND SAN REMO CASES

The "SubstantiallyAdvances" Test for Regulatory Takings

The second of the three cases decided this Term did not deal with an express
exercise of eminent domain. Rather, Lingle dealt with when a regulation on land use
could interfere with private property rights to such an extent that compensation would be
necessary. 4 14 The questioned regulation had been passed by the State of Hawaii. 4 15 It
limited the amount oil companies could charge as rent to independent dealers who leased
stations from the companies. 4 16 The avowed purpose was to prevent concentration in
4 17
the retail gasoline market, and thereby protect consumers from high gasoline prices.
Unlike the typical regulatory takings case, the attack on the statute did not allege that the
law denied the private party a return on its property or otherwise interfered with property
use. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. ("Chevron") assaulted the statute employing a different test,
one that had become "ensconced in... Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, ''4 18 perhaps by
accident.
Chevron only alleged that the statute would not work, and therefore failed to
"substantially advance legitimate [state] interest. ''4 19 Chevron's equation of such a
failure with a "taking" reflected a test found in Agins v. City of Tiburon,420 where the
Supreme Court noted, in the disjunctive, that a regulation could be a taking if it "does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically viable
use of his land. ' A2 1 The Ninth Circuit, twice, agreed with Chevron that a taking could be
proven by meeting either of the two tests. 422 It eventually agreed that the statute would
not meet its stated purpose, essentially finding that Chevron's expert economist was
more persuasive than that of the State. 4 23 In a unanimous decision written by Justice
O'Connor, the Supreme Court reversed.
The reversal was not based on the factual conclusion, but was because the Supreme
Court disavowed the premise that a taking could be proven based on a facial examination
of the regulation's ability to meet its goals. 4 24 The unanimous decision acknowledged

414. See 125 S. Ct. at 2078-79. Regulatory takings emerged from a statement that regulation can impose on
property rights without compensation unless it "goes too far." Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922) [hereinafter Penn. Coal]. As Justice O'Connor acknowledged, early constitutional theorists did not
include regulation as a possible trigger for Fifth Amendment compensation. Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2081.
415. Id. at2078.
416. Id. (explaining the statute would limit rent to 15% of gross profits from gasoline sales and 15% of gross
sales of other products).
417. Id.at2079.
418. Id. at 2078.
419. Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2079.
420. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
421. Id.at 260 (citation omitted, emphasis added).
422. The case first traveled to the Ninth Circuit sub nom Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030 (9th
Cir. 2000); after remand, it was decided as sub nom Chevron USA, Inc. v. Bronster, 363 F.3d 846 (9th
Cir. 2004), rev'dsub nom.Lingle, 125 S.Ct. 2074.
423. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Haw. 2002), aff'd sub nom. Chevron
USA, Inc., 363 F.3d at 855-58.
424. Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2078; see also id.at 2085 (decrying courts being put in the fact-finding role of
ascertaining "the need for, and likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions").

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol41/iss2/6

42

Mansfield: Takings and Threes: The Supreme Court's 2004-2005 Term

2005]

TAKINGS AND THREES

that the Agins disjunctive formulation was misfortunate; the Court, in dealing with a
zoning case for the first time in many years, had referenced language from cases based
on substantive due process. 425 No Supreme Court case had used the "failure to
substantially advance" test as an independent test to determine whether a regulation
constituted an uncompensated taking.4 26 Recapping its takings jurisprudence, the Court
reaffirmed that there are only three ways to show that a regulation is a taking of private
property: (1) if it results in a physical appropriation, 4 27 (2) if it results in a complete
denial of economical use or value of the property and the restriction was not inherent in
the background principles of law,4 28 or (3) if, after an ad hoc appraisal of Penn Central
factors the burden on the regulated is too great.429 Each of these tests requires
examining the impact of the regulation on a particular piece of property. In the Lingle
litigation, Chevron had never alleged the regulation would deprive it of any economic
return on its property; the company could receive compensation from the dealers through
charges for products, and the rental limitation did not lessen its return. 430 It had not,
431
therefore, made a takings allegation'that could survive a summary judgment.
Justice Kennedy provided a short concurrence. Although he agreed that the failure
to substantially advance an argument could not support a takings allegation, he took care
to reserve the possibility that there could be situations where a regulation is so arbitrary
or irrational that it violates due process directly. 432 Because Chevron had dismissed its
due process allegation, the present situation could not be reviewed even under a
433
"'permissive standard."
As with Kelo, the Supreme Court's decision was not remarkable. 4 34 Only in one
situation, when a government requires a dedication of land as a condition of
435
developmental approval, had the Supreme Court examined the efficacy of regulation.
If the Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit, it would have invited a heightened
scrutiny of economic regulations that impact on land in a manner reminiscent of the
Lochner v. New York 43643era, under the guise of regulatory analysis.4 37 Additionally,
425. Id. at 2083.
426. Id. at 2086.
427. Id. at 2081 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436).
428. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2081 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003). In Lingle, the Supreme Court continues to use
both denial of "all economical use" and "value" as the trigger for a Lucas "categorical" taking. See Mansfield,
supra n. 28, at pt. Il(B). Which language is used could be important.
429. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2081-82 (citing Penn C. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104).
430. Id. at 2084-85.
431. Idat 2087.
432. Id.
(Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
433. Id. (quoting Eastern Enterprises,524 U.S. at 550 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part)).
434. If, however, it had upheld the Ninth Circuit, Lingle would have been noteworthy. See Echeverria,
supra n. 1, at 10577 (averring that Lingle was the most important case of the three decided this Term).
435. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 375 (1994) (requiring a "rough proportionality" between the
remedy and the harm that would be created by the development (internal quotation marks omitted));
Nollan, 483 U.S. 825 (requiring a nexus between the harm to be remedied and the required dedication); see
also Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2086-87 (discussing these cases as narrowly applicable to exactions, in which the
government receives an interest in land that would be takings automatically if not for the fact that the private
party gains a permit to develop).
436. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating regulation prohibiting employers from employing bakers for more than
sixty hours a week after an examination of whether the regulation was an appropriate means to a legitimate
end).
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affirming would have totally removed regulatory takings jurisprudence from its mooring,
namely that some regulations are akin to physical appropriations in their disparate impact
on an individual landowner, making them shoulder costs that should more fairly be
spread.
B.

43 8

State Adjudicationof FederalClaims

At issue in San Remo was the procedure for gaining redress for a state regulatory
439
action that arguably "took" private property in violation of the federal Constitution.
Normally, entry to federal court when there is an allegation that a federal constitutional
right has been violated is through a section 1983 claim.440 To violate the constitutional
prohibition against a taking, however, a claimant must show both that a taking has
occurred, namely a sufficiently egregious imposition on private property rights under
existing tests, 44 1 and that there was no compensation offered. 442 The Supreme Court,
therefore, has required litigants to assure that the state agency has made a final
determination of how it would treat the subject property and that the litigant has
exhausted state procedures for gaining compensation. These procedures can result in
state courts adjudicating federal claims. This happened in San Remo, and the claimants
sought an exception to the federal full faith and credit statute 443 so as to allow a claimant
to re-litigate whether a violation of the federal Constitution has occurred after a state
444
court has ruled in the matter.
The claimants owned the San Remo Hotel in San Francisco. 445 The City had
446
imposed conditions on residential hotels that desired to convert to tourism use.
Claimants argued the provisions imposed, including a $567,000 fee, were an
unconstitutional taking of their property, especially in light of an inaccurate report a

437. As Justice O'Connor phrased it, id at 2085 (emphasis in original):
[T]he "substantially advances" formula is not only doctrinally untenable as a takings test-its
application as such would also present serious practical difficulties. The Agins formula can be read
to demand heightened means-ends review of virtually any regulation of private property. If so
interpreted, it would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state and federal
regulations-a task for which courts are not well suited. Moreover, it would empower-and might
often require-courts to substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and
expert agencies.
438. See Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 ("The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."). Justice O'Connor again cited one
of her touchstone cases for this point. See Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2080 (commenting that the Fifth Amendment is
designed to protect individual property owners from bearing public burdens "which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole" (quoting Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))).
439. See 125 S. Ct. at 2495.
440. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color
of state law).
441. See Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2081-82 (listing current takings tests); see supra nn. 427-429 and
accompanying text.
442. See generallyDana & Merrill, supra n. 11, at 254-65.
443. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. This statute includes the doctrines of resjudicata(claims preclusion) and collateral
estoppel (issue preclusion). See San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2500.
444. San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2495.
445. Id.
446. Id.
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decade earlier about the number of rooms in the hotel devoted to residential use.44 7 The
owners were directed from federal court to state court under Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City.448 Williamson
County provided that a takings claim challenging the application of land-use regulations
is not ripe unless "the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has
reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at
issue." 449 Litigation in state court is required first to determine issues of state law as
applied to a particular property and to "seek compensation though the procedures the
State has provided for doing so.',450 The problem, from the viewpoint of the hotel
owners, was that the California court, while ostensibly deciding whether there was a
taking under the California Constitution, also analyzed the case under federal
precedents. 4 51 After the state court decided that neither Constitution was violated, the
owners attempted to return to federal court, encountering the argument that issue
preclusion prohibited re-litigating the question of a violation of the federal
Constitution.

452

The Ninth Circuit determined that the full faith and credit statute did require the
federal courts to refrain from considering the federal constitutional issue again. 4 53 On
certiorari, the Supreme Court stated the issue as "whether 'a Fifth Amendment Takings
claim [is] barred by issue preclusion based on a judgment denying compensation solely
under state law, which was rendered in a state court proceeding that was required to
ripen the federal Takings claim?.. ' 45 4 The Court refused to except from the statute
situations where the plaintiff was perhaps forced into state court.4 55 In fact, the Court
quibbled as to whether the owners were "forced" to litigate all the issues litigated in state
court. 456 In the opinion Justice Stevens drafted,4 57 the majority noted that there was no

right to have federal rights determined in a federal court; state courts are capable of
the federal system would be
interpreting the federal Constitution. 4 58 The route 4into
59
through a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

447. Id. at 2496.
448. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
449. Id. at 186.
450. Id. at 194 (footnote omitted).
451. San Remo, 125 S. Ct.at 2495.
452. Id. at 2499 (noting the plaintiffs did not file a writ of certiorari from the California state court denial of
their claims; they returned to federal court).
453. San Remo Hotel L.P. v. S.F. City & County, 364 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004). The second circuit had
ruled the opposite. See Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118 (2nd Cir. 2003).
454. San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2495 n. I (quoting Pet. for Cert., at i, San Remo, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (available
at 2004 WL 2031862 (Sept. 7, 2004))) (bracket in original).
455. Id. at 2495.
456. Id.at 2497-98 (noting that petitioners framed their state court proceeding to include more issues than
those on which the federal courts abstained); see also id. at 2503 (noting that petitioners included more than a
writ of administrative mandamus in state court).
457. Justices Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in the opinion.
458. Id.at 2504, 2507.
459. San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2506.
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The Court's holding on the facts was not surprising. The Court was not creating an
implied exception to the full faith and credit statute. 4 6 What might be of import in the
future lay in the concurring opinion. Four Justices would re-examine in an "appropriate
case ' 4 6 1 the Williamson County requirement of prior litigation of the compensation issue
in state court.462 These four Justices have generally been more sensitive to claims of
private property owners. 4 63 Therefore, the import of San Remo may be in signaling a
future Supreme Court decision that will make it easier to seek protection of private
property in federal courts. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, however, were
two of the Justices and their replacements on the Court will have to weigh in.
IV.

CONCLUSION: JUSTICE KENNEDY AND MEANINGFUL AD Hoc ADJUDICATION

Taken as a group, Kelo, Lingle, and San Remo do not rewrite takings law. On the
substantive side, Kelo refused to adopt a per se rule that would forbid condemnations for
economic development. In Lingle, the Court spumed judicial second-guessing of
whether a law substantially advances a legitimate government purpose as a separate
takings test, independent of ascertaining the impact on a particular landowner. Rejection
of this ground for facial challenge of a state law also removes an avenue for litigation of
takings directly in federal court. 464 This complements the holding of San Remo, which
expressly retained procedural requirements that channel takings litigation into state
courts. State courts arguably can apply ad hoc, fact-sensitive appraisals of takings
claims under the federal Constitution and, if they desire, grant additional protection
under state takings clauses. Relying on fact-sensitive review allows consideration of
both public and private expectations. It does not, however, mean an abdication of
judicial review. Justice Kennedy twice reminded his colleagues of the availability of
some substantive due process requirements for legislation.
Justice Kennedy concurred in both Kelo and Lingle. In Kelo, he first applied a
rational basis test to ascertain that the condemnation was appropriately one for public
use, noting that the Berman-Midkiff standard resembled that used to review economic
regulation under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 4 65 When there is a
"plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism' 46 6 involved with a condemnation for

460. The Court emphasized that the exhaustion requirement did not apply to facial challenges to state
regulatory actions, just to as applied actions. Id. at 2506.
461. Id. at 2510 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
462. Id. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in Rehnquist's concurrence. Id. at 2507.
463. They are the "familiar" grouping on takings issues. See Mansfield, supra n. 28, at 264 n. 7 (grouping
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and O'Connor together in takings analyses). The four are
also often insistent on states' rights. It was the majority opinion, however, that appeared more solicitous of
state courts and their sensitivity to land use matters as "local concerns." San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2507
("Indeed, state courts undoubtedly have more experience than federal courts do in resolving the complex
factual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning and land-use regulations."). The concurrence rejected
this as an affirmative argument for a state-litigation requirement, noting that plaintiffs could directly challenge
such laws in federal court based on the First Amendment. Id. at 2509 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). But see
Mansfield, supra n. 365, at 219, 244-45 (discussing Justice Rehnquist's declaration that land use is a
traditional state concern).
464. See San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2506 n. 25.
465. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
466. Id.
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economic development, Justice Kennedy charged a court with the task of conducting a
fair inquiry into the allegations under this standard. 4 67 He also acknowledged that some
situations might require a stricter inquiry. For this proposition, he cited his concurrence
in the judgment in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel. 468 He cited the same opinion for this
premise in Lingle: "[T]oday's decision does not foreclose the possibility that a regulation
might be so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process. ' ' 69 Justice Kennedy added
47
that a regulation's failure to meet its goals could enter such a determination. 0
Meaningful review both for applications of eminent domain and regulations that impact
on private property might exist outside of takings law.
Returning from Lingle and Kelo to Eastern Enterprisesis instructive. In the earlier
case, no specific property was allegedly burdened. The statute in question was a
mechanism for funding health care benefits for retired coal miners and would assign a
company a pecuniary amount. 47 1 In an action seeking injunctive relief, the plurality
declared the statute to be a taking of coal companies' property under the three-part Penn
Central balancing test; the legislation was described as "impos[ing] severe retroactive
liability on a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the liability, and 4the
72
extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate to the parties' experience.'
Justice Kennedy concurred in the
The statute was only invalidated, however, because
4 74
judgment. 473 He did not concur in the rationale.
Justice Kennedy refused to use takings law when the questioned statute merely
imposed a financial burden, albeit a large one. To trigger regulatory takings analysis
required "a specific property right or interest ...at stake.''475 Moreover, Justice
Kennedy understood the plurality's motivation in seizing upon takings analysis; the
plurality wanted to avoid a normative judgment about Congress's wisdom, but
essentially made one. In so doing, Justice Kennedy stated that they revealed a tension
with a basic understanding of the Takings Clause, namely that it simply requires
compensation for an otherwise authorized act, and does not act as a substantive limit on
the government's ability to act. 476 In Eastern Enterprises, Justice Kennedy separated
4 77
takings jurisprudence from other substantive reviews, such as Due Process,
and emphasized that takings are concerned essentially with how property rights are
affected.

467. See id
468. Id. at 2670 (citing Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. 549-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting
in part)).
469. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 539
(Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part)).
470. Id.
471. Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 504.
472. Id.at 528-29 (plurality).
473. Id. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
474. Id.
475. Id.at 541; see also Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 554 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting) (agreeing that takings analysis does not apply).
476. Id. at 544-45.
477. Id.at 550 (finding the statute violated due process even under a permissive standard).
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Ultimately, the Takings Clause is about fairness and expectations about property
rights. Bright-line rules are not conducive to adjusting the myriad of interests that
co-exist and inter-mingle in a complex society. The cases from the 2004-2005 Supreme
Court Term reflect this realization.
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